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Abstract
This study investigates the link between bank concentration and interest rate pass-through
(IRPT) in four sub-Saharan countries. It also analyses whether there is asymmetry in IRPT and
whether such asymmetry is related to changes in bank concentration. By applying a number
of econometric methods including Asymmetric Error Correction Models, Mean Adjustment Lag
(MAL) models and Autoregressive Distributed Lag models on monthly data for the period 1994-
2007, the study found some evidence of a relationship between bank concentration and IRPT in
all four countries. However, the results reveal that bank concentration has a stronger inﬂuence
on the magnitude of its adjustment rather than its speed. Of particular note in this investigation
i st h ef a c tt h a tt h eﬁndings support both the Structure-Conduct-Performance hypothesis and
the competing Eﬃcient-Structure hypothesis in the banking industries of the four countries.
While there is some evidence supporting the view that bank lending and deposit rates adjust
asymmetrically to changes in policy rates, there is very limited evidence that these asymmetries
are a result of bank concentration. The key implication of the result for African countries is that
increased bank concentration through bank consolidation programmes designed to strengthen
banking industries should not be viewed with cynicism in so far as monetary policy transmission
is concerned because concentration does not necessarily undermine the eﬀectiveness of monetary
policy.
Keywords Bank Concentration Monetary Policy Interest Rate Pass-Through Asymmetric
Adjustment Sub-Saharan Africa
JEL Classiﬁcation E52 E58 G28
1I N T R O D U C T I O N
While there generally has been consensus on the importance of eﬀective monetary policy, debate
on the most appropriate means to achieve it has created long-standing issues in the literature of
monetary economics and central banking (Rasche and Williams, 2005). According to Mishkin (1995),
monetary policy is only eﬀective if its tools are able quickly to transmit monetary impulses to interest
rates and if the resultant new structure of interest rates aﬀect real expenditure. If market rates are
sluggish in their adjustment to policy rate changes, then the desired goals of the monetary policy
change may not be achieved despite the size of the change in the policy rates. In this system the
banking industry is the gatekeeper, because the monetary policy shifts are enacted through changes
in interest rates which banks are expected to reﬂect in revised lending and deposit rates to the public.
Given that the banks, as conduits of monetary policy transmission, determine the strength1 of the
interest rate pass-through (IRPT) by setting lending and deposit rates by banks, research has focused
∗All authors from the Department of Economics, Rhodes University, P.O. Box 94, Grahamstown 6140. E-mails:
g04m3891@campus.ru.ac.za; zchinzara@yahoo.com; h.nel@ru.ac.za, respectively. † Corresponding author.
1A perfect IRPT refers to a pass-through process in which oﬃcial rates are fully and quickly reﬂe c t e di nb a n k
lending and deposit rates. This makes IRPT analysis synonymous with the measurement of its speed and magnitude.
1on identifying elements of the banking industry that could provide incentives or disincentives for
banks to adjust their market rates in line with policy rate changes. Amongst the most contentious of
these is bank concentration which is particularly interesting because diﬀerent industrial organisation
theories, and the interpretation of those theories, provide ambiguous implications for the relationship
between changing bank concentration and the conduct of banks and, ultimately, the IRPT.
There are two opposing views on the impact that a concentrated banking system would have
on the setting of bank lending and deposit rates and, by extension, that banking industry’s IRPT.
The ﬁrst is the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) hypothesis discussed in Hannan and Berger’s
(1991) analysis of US bank price rigidities and the second is the Eﬃcient-Structure (ES) hypothesis
investigated by Peltzman’s (1969) analysis of monetary transmission in the American banking sys-
tem. In the SCP the structure of an industry inﬂuences the conduct of its members, which in turn
inﬂuences the performance of that industry. For example, an uncompetitive banking industry (struc-
ture) is likely to result in ineﬃcient practices and a reduced incentive to respond quickly to monetary
policy stance changes (conduct) resulting in a sluggish and incomplete IRPT (performance). Put
simply, the SCP suggests that allowing the banking industry to become more concentrated, through
consolidation programmes for example, would weaken the IRPT based on the expected behaviour
of market participants in highly concentrated markets. In contrast, the ES suggests that concen-
tration would increase the overall eﬃciency of the banking industry, resulting in banks pricing their
products more competitively and thus becoming more sensitive to monetary policy impulses. This
is based on the precept that increased concentration is due to more eﬃcient banks growing more
rapidly than less eﬃcient banks, or more eﬃcient banks taking over less eﬃcient ones. If this is the
case, at least up to some point, banks would price their services more competitively2, rather than
less competitively.
Eﬀectively, the ESH suggests that the IRPT would strengthen as the market became more con-
centrated, as all ineﬃcient banks that failed to respond in a timely fashion to policy rate changes were
competed out of the market (Allen and Gale, 2003). Empirically, in the work of Hannan and Berger
(1991), Neumark and Sharpe (1992) and Scholnick (1996), banking sector concentration inﬂuences
bank conduct and consequently the nature of the IRPT. Conversely, in the studies conducted by
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), Berstein and Fuentes (2005) and Abbasoglu et al. (2005), banking
sector concentration does not inﬂuence the IRPT. As evidenced by this, not only are the theories
not in agreement but the disparities are confounded by conﬂicts in the evidence from empirical
research. Understanding whether or not bank industry concentration is related to a weak or strong
IRPT is important because it will inform banking sector competition regulation. If concentration
impedes the IRPT, and consequently the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy, then it is of paramount
importance that the banking industry be regulated to increase the number of market participants
and reduce concentration. If concentration improves the IRPT then banking regulators may need to
consider the possibility of consolidating their banking industries to encourage more concentration to
enhance the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy3. In addition to informing the regulation of the banking
industry, identifying a relationship has implications for the setting of monetary policy when bank
concentration is changing. To illustrate, should bank concentration be related to a slower IRPT,
then the timing of oﬃcial rate changes must change to ensure that they are set early enough to
have the desired eﬀect at the desired time. If, on the other hand, bank concentration is related to
a weakening of the magnitude of the IRPT, then policy changes must be large enough to cater for
the diminished reﬂection of oﬃcial rates in bank lending and deposit rates.
In addition to the issues highlighted above, an important element of IRPT often overlooked is
2Here the word “competitively” is taken to refer to pricing strategies that reﬂect closely the changes in the oﬃcial
rate. This is the case because the competition would remove the scope for large disparities between the two or for
slow adjustments in the bank rates in response to oﬃcial rate changes.
3It is important to note that the results on whether high or low bank concentration is related to a weakening
or strengthening IRPT can only partially inform banking sector competition regulation as other implications of a
highly/lowly concentrated banking sector must also be considered. For example, questions concerning the impact of
concentration on ﬁnancial stability (see Allen and Gale, 2003) can be considered.
2the possibility of asymmetry in the adjustment of both deposit and lending rates by banks following
monetary policy changes. Are lending and deposit rates similarly responsive to impulses to adjust
upwards and downwards and does bank concentration aﬀect this responsiveness? Two competing
hypotheses have been put forward that suggest possible asymmetry in IRPT. On the one hand,
the collusive behaviour hypothesis posits that banks in highly concentrated markets may respond
more positively to impulses to adjust their lending rates4 upwards rather than downwards, because of
their collective market power, thus resulting in asymmetric lending rate adjustments. In such a case,
simply assessing the adjustment under the assumption that the rate would adjust similarly up and
down would miss the important fact that bank concentration may be associated with a weakening of
the impulse to reduce lending rates and not the impulse to increase them. For this reason ignoring
the possibility of asymmetry in adjustment could lead to erroneous conclusions about the presence
and nature of a relationship between bank concentration and bank lending and deposit rates. On
the other hand, the adverse customer reaction hypothesis suggests that, in an environment where
borrowers have bargaining power, rigidities may occur in the downward adjustment of deposit rates
following an expansionary policy stance and in upward adjustments of lending rates following a
contractionary monetary policy stance.
The potential issues relating to banking sector concentration have been made pertinent given
trends in bank consolidation in Africa and a lack of empirical research on the matter on the continent.
Thus the current study attempts to ﬁll this void by investigating this potentially important link
between bank concentration and the strength of the IRPT in Botswana, Nigeria, South Africa and
Zambia. Furthermore, the study analyses whether there is asymmetry in pass-through and whether
this asymmetry is a consequence of bank concentration. The rest of this paper is organised as
follows: Section 2 provides a literature review; Section 3 presents an overview of monetary policy in
the four countries; Section 4 discusses the analytical framework and data used in the paper; Section
5 presents the results; and Section 6 gives the conclusions and their policy implications.
2 THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
While bank concentration and the IRPT can be described and identiﬁed separately, there is no
explicitly stated theoretical representation of the interaction between them (Hoﬀman and Mizen,
2001)5. Consequently, the study of their relationship is focused on a merger of an understanding of
market concentration and its potential inﬂuences on the behaviour of banks when making pricing
decisions on deposits and loans. To this end De Bondt (2002) puts forward a simple marginal cost
view of bank pricing decisions. The method suggests that a bank’s interest rate (lending and deposit)
“IB" is equal to a markup “X” plus a fraction “β” of the policy interest rate “IM”. Algebraically
this is represented as follows:
IB = X + β(IM) (1)
Under perfectly competitive conditions the pass-through parameter “β” is 1, which means that
shocks in the oﬃcial rates are fully reﬂected in the individual bank’s interest rates. Should it
be below one, because of a lack of perfect information or bankers’ resistance to monetary policy
impulses, the changes in oﬃcial rates are not fully reﬂected in the individual bank’s interest rates.
Equation 1 provides a primary model of bank pricing decisions from which to assess the sensitivity
of bank lending and deposit rates to changes in monetary policy rates and in so doing the strength
and magnitude of the IRPT. Where concentration can be found to inﬂuence “β,”concentration
c c a nb es e e nt oi n ﬂuence the IRPT. The other element in this study, bank concentration, can be
described as the degree to which a relatively small number of banks account for a relatively large
4Note that lending rates represent returns on assets, namely, loans.
5There are theories (explored here) regarding why it may be made smoother/stronger or more rigid/weak, however,
these are not actually IRPT theories but theories surrounding IRPT changes; for example, theories on bank behaviour.
3percentage of the banking market (Alegria and Schaeck, 2007: 4)6. In the empirical work, Cottarelli
and Kourelis (1994) measured the speed of the adjustment of bank lending rates in 31 industrial and
developing countries by regressing the lending rate on a distributed lag of money market rates. After
determining the eﬀects on lending rates of shocks in money market rates and tracking these eﬀects
over three months, six months and the long run they sought to explain cross-country diﬀerences
by banking industry characteristics. One of the factors they investigated was bank concentration,
which they observed as having no pronounced eﬀect on the pass-through. Cottarelli et al. (1995)
studied 63 banks in Italy from June 1986 to December 1993. Using an error correction model
on monthly data over the period they established that bank concentration did have a signiﬁcant
impact on the IRPT. The authors argued the ﬁve ﬁr mc o n c e n t r a t i o nr a t i o( C R 5 )u s e di nC o t t a r e l l i
and Kourelis (1994) was a weak measure of market concentration and so they used the Herﬁndahl
Hirschman Index (HHI). Their ﬁndings supported the existence of a negative relationship between
bank concentration and the speed of the pass-through and were in line with Hannan and Berger’s
(1991) ﬁndings for US banks. Consistent with the Structure-Conduct-Performance hypothesis, banks
in the most concentrated local markets were found to pay money market deposit account rates that
ranged from 25 to 100 basis points less than those paid in the least concentrated markets. In contrast
to this ﬁnding, Berstein and Fuentes (2005) found results that were similar to Cottarelli and Kourelis
(1994). They found that the speed of adjustment was aﬀected by banking sector expectations and
interest rate volatility, but not concentration. Taking monthly data on deposit interest rates of
diﬀerent maturities in Chile, from May 1995 to December 2002, and concentration ratios of the
three largest (CR3) banks, the ﬁve largest banks (CR5) and the HHI, their study showed that bank
interest rates responded by between 75% and 88% to changes in the interbank interest rate. However,
the authors conceded that their results were not in line with their expectations and so sought an
explanation. In their research they found that concentration aﬀected the coeﬃcient of the lagged
variables in their model and thus it had a long-run inﬂuence that could be missed in a short-run
analysis. From this they concluded that market concentration negatively aﬀected the interest rate
pass-through, the only issue being when this eﬀect would be felt in the pass-through. Importantly
here, was the observation that the inﬂuence of market concentration could be missed if the analysis
of the relationship was conﬁned to the short run. In addition, the study also identiﬁed the potential
for an asymmetric relationship in which bank concentration only inﬂuences one type of change in
the bank lending and deposit rates7. Abbasoglu et al. (2005) presented another study that refuted
the link between interest rate pass-through rigidity and the level of concentration in the banking
sector. Taking CR3, CR5 and the HHI for Turkish banks from 2001 to 2005, they saw no evidence
suggesting that there was a relationship between bank concentration and the IRPT. Of importance
in their work was the identiﬁcation that the IRPT was inﬂuenced by the level of banking sector
competition. This observation was important because Van Leuvensteijn et al.’s (2008) work would
suggest that contention existed in the study of bank concentration and the IRPT because researchers
had been studying the eﬀect of competition on the IRPT and not that of bank concentration. As a
result, the expected relationship between bank competition and the IRPT was sometimes mistakenly
represented as the relationship between bank concentration and the IRPT8.I nP a k i s t a n ,C e n t r a l
6It is important to note that concentration is a relative measure and while absolute measures of what constitutes a
lowly concentrated or highly concentrated market can be suggested, these would be highly contentious and subjective
in the very least. For the purposes of this investigation concentration is compared between countries and over rolling
windows (as shown in section on the methods used for analysis).
7To illustrate, we follow Tomasz (2003) who observes that bank concentration need not exert a symmetric eﬀect
on the pass-through: it may speed up the pass-through in times of declining interest rates, while slowing it down in
periods of increasing interest rates. In such a case, failure to consider the asymmetric response would yield confusing
results.
8S u c ham i s t a k ec a nb eu n d e r s t o o dw h e nc o n c e n t r a t i o nc a nb e seen sometimes to be closely related to competition,
for example, where the performance of an industry (competitiveness) is greatly inﬂuenced by the structure of the ﬁrms
in the industry (concentration). Where concentration is high, for example, competitive pressures may be abated by
tacit collusion on the part of the participating ﬁrm. In such a situation concentration and competition are closely and
negatively related.
4and Eastern Europe Quayyum et al. (2005) and Egert et al. (2007) found evidence supporting
a relationship between bank concentration and the IRPT. While Quayyum et al. (2005) used
Box et al.’s “Intervention Approach" and Egert et al. (2007) used a bivariate error correction
system, their results both revealed that developing countries had discernable relationships between
the concentration of their banking sector and their IRPT. From the foregoing, it is evident that the
theoretical literature is ambiguous on the relationship between bank concentration and IRPT, with
the big question being whether concentration promotes collusive and uncompetitive behaviour by
banks, as the SCP suggests, or whether it enhances eﬃciency by ﬂushing out uncompetitive banks,
as the ESH suggests. In addition, that concentration may have an asymmetric response on bank
rates, may suggest that symmetric tests ignoring this possibility will struggle to arrive at a consensus
on its expected inﬂuence. With this in mind, the current study is particularly important as it is the
ﬁrst attempt, to the authors’ knowledge, to address this issue for African countries.
3 OVERVIEW OF MONETARY POLICY AND BANKING
INDUSTRY IN THE COUNTRIES
3.1 Monetary Policy
The principal objectives of monetary policy in all four countries were the maintenance of stable price
levels, the preservation of an environment conducive to economic growth and the maintenance of the
balance of payments. However, despite similar objectives, the targets of monetary policy diﬀered,
with South Africa and Botswana using inﬂation targets while Zambia and Nigeria used monetary
aggregates (South African Reserve Bank, 2009; Bank of Botswana, 2009, Central Bank of Nigeria,
2009; Bank of Zambia, 2009). In each of the four countries, interest rates are a critical tool for the
conduct of monetary policy. Consequently, the behaviour of private banks in setting lending and
deposit rates potentially could have a profound eﬀect on the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy. In
Figure 1, plots showing how well the movements in policy rates are mirrored by movement in lending
and deposit rates are given for each country.
There is a clear positive trend for the policy, lending and deposit rates in South Africa suggesting
a close relationship between these interest rates. Zambia also has similar trends in the movement of
its interest rates. For Botswana, the trend is clearest between the policy rate and the lending rate,
while the trend with deposit rates is weak. Of the four countries, Nigeria presents the weakest trend
amongst the interest rates. While the general pattern of rates shows a positive relationship, like in
the other countries, the movement is not as closely related.
To complement this preliminary graphical analysis, correlation coeﬃcients for each country’s
deposit and lending rate with the central bank rate were computed and the results are reported in
Table 1.
In line with the graphical plots, South Africa has the highest correlation coeﬃcients, followed
by Zambia, whose correlation coeﬃcients are marginally below those of South Africa. Botswana
and Nigeria have nearly similar correlation coeﬃcients for both the oﬃcial rate and the lending
rate, while Botswana has by far the lowest correlation coeﬃcients between oﬃcial and deposit rates.
Despite the observations made above, it should be noted that the graphical plots and the correlation
coeﬃcients are not meant to draw conclusions about the speed and magnitude of the IRPT. They
do, however, give a picture of how well the retail rates seem to respond to the oﬃcial rate and
thus help stimulate questions about the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy in the four countries. For
instance, South Africa and Zambia exhibit the closest trends and strongest correlation in the policy,
lending and deposit rates, while Botswana exhibits the weakest correlation between the oﬃcial rate
and the deposit rate. Does this imply that pass-through is strongest in South Africa and Zambia,
and that pass-through to the deposit rate is quite rigid in Botswana? More analysis is needed to
answer these questions.
53.2 Banking concentration
Generally, with the exception of South Africa, bank concentration declined over the sample period.
The decreases seem to be more apparent in Nigeria and Zambia. The major inﬂuences in the
declining concentration were the adoption of more liberal ﬁnancial regulation, the encouragement
of banking sector growth to cater to growing markets, and the desire to improve ﬁnancial service
delivery and capacity.
These trends in bank concentration can be explained as follows; in Botswana, the threat of
market power abuse necessitated the encouragement of increased industry participation (Kayawe
and Amusa, 2003: 5). In an eﬀort to develop the ﬁnancial services sector, the requirements for
starting up a Nigerian bank were relaxed, with drastic reductions in statutory reserve requirements.
The resultant rapid increase in the number of banks led to the existence of many banks without sound
ﬁnancial foundations — and the failure of many. This failure of banks necessitated the introduction
of a bank consolidation exercise in 2004, to restore ﬁnancial stability which was threatened by the
fragile banking industry (Soludo, 2004: 2).
In Zambia ﬁnancial reforms in 1991 led to a more liberalised ﬁnancial sector, which drew more
banking sector participants. However, this liberalisation also resulted in increased bank failures and
the stunted growth of existing banks (Musonda, 2008). In South Africa, it is surprising that, despite
post-democratisation policies meant to ensure that a large number of the previously unbanked black
population got access to ﬁnancial intermediaries (SARB, 2010), concentration has not decreased
signiﬁcantly. This was mainly due to bank consolidation that began in the late 1980s when proﬁt
margins were falling due to non-performing loans and the high cost of modern technology (Gidlow,
2003). Gidlow (2003) also suggests that despite the inception of the Banks Act of 1995, that
encouraged entry of foreign banks to enhance competition, concentration has continued to rise as
foreign banks limited their activities to niche markets due to their failure to compete with the big
four South African banks in the core areas of retail banking9.
4A N A L Y T I C A L F R A M E W O R K
4.1 Methodology, Modelling Framework and Econometric Procedure
In order to address the question of whether bank concentration is relevant in IRPT this study uses
two approaches. The ﬁrst approach uses the overall average bank concentration for the entire period
in each of the four countries. The average bank concentration is then compared with the IRPTs
corresponding to the same time period, to evaluate whether countries with the highest (lowest)
bank concentration have the weakest (strongest) IRPT. The second approach involves tracing the
dynamics of IRPT and bank concentration over time using an 8-year rolling window10. The idea here
is to examine whether the time-to-time dynamics in bank concentration are related to time-to-time
dynamics in IRPT in each of the countries.
The starting point in analysing IRPT is the speciﬁcation of a primary model which shows how
rational commercial banks make pricing decisions on their loans and deposits, cognisant of the cost of
obtaining accommodation from the central bank (Scholnick, 1996 and Aziakpono et al., 2007). This
model is a simple speciﬁcation De Bondt’s model (Equation 1) representing the long-run relationship
between policy rates and bank lending/deposit rates as follows:
RRt = α0 + β1CBRt + ut (2)
where RRt is the endogenously determined retail rate (in this study deposit and lending interest
rates), CBR is the policy dictated rate, α0 is an intercept which denotes a mark up/mark down
9For a comprehensive discussion of the South African banking industry see Aziakpono and Wilson (2010).
10The 8-year period was chosen to ensure that each period had approximately 100 observations to prevent small
sample bias.
6on the retail rates to reﬂect market conditions, e.g. credit risk premium on the lending rate (see
Marotta, 2009 ), β1 is the slope parameter that shows the fraction of the change in oﬃcial rates
that is reﬂected in changes in the retail rates in the long-run. A β1 close to 0 would imply that the
long-run IRPT is slow and weak. While a β1 of 1 would be desirable as it implies that the policy
rate is fully reﬂected in bank retail rates, it would be unlikely because of a number of factors such
as asymmetric information, market imperfections, menu cost, switching costs and adverse customer
reactions (Aziakpono and Wilson, 2010: 19). Consequently, β1 is likely to be between 0 and 1, with a
value close to 1 implying high and near complete pass-through, and vice versa In rare circumstances,
overpass-through might occur when commercial banks respond to higher risks posed by asymmetric
information by charging very high interest rates resulting in β1 >1 (De Bondt, 2005; Aziakpono and
Wilson, 2010). Variations in the magnitude of IRPT are reﬂe c t e di nt h ev a r i a t i o ni nt h es i z eo fβ1,
while variations in the speed of IRPT adjustment are reﬂected by the variation in the time taken for
β1 to be fully reﬂected in the bank lending and deposit rates. Finally ut is a stochastic error term.
The simplest way to estimate the long run parameters α0and β1would be by using the Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) technique. However it is well documented that time series can be non-stationary
resulting in spurious regressions when they are used (Guajarati, 2002). In this study we test for
stationarity using the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) approach and the Kwiatkowski, Phillips,
Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS) tests for stationarity11 to ensure we have robust results.
For series that are stationary, OLS was used to estimate the long-run parameters in equation
(2). Otherwise the series were diﬀerenced to make them stationary before estimating (provided that
the series were stationary at ﬁrst diﬀerence), in which case the long-run properties of the series were
lost and the resulting parameter was interpreted as the short-run relationship between the oﬃcial
r a t ea n dt h er e t a i lr a t e s .B a s e do ne q u a t i o n( 2 )t h e model for estimating the short-run parameter
is the following autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model:






λj∆RRt−j + εt (3)
where ∆ is a ﬁrst diﬀerence operator, n and m denote the maximum number of lags chosen based
on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), εt is a white noise error term, and δ0 and δ1are short-run
parameters which in this context can be interpreted as the short run/immediate pass-through and
due to various impediments as mentioned earlier it is likely to be lower than the long-run pass-
through (β1). Following Kwapil and Scharler (2009), the symmetric LR impact of a policy rate
change can then be computed from equation (2) as follows:







To determine a symmetric adjustment for the non-stationary and non-cointegrated series of
equation 3 is re-estimated by distinguishing between episodes of increasing and decreasing policy
rate as follows:













λj∆RRt−j + εkt (5)
w h e r en ,pa n dma r et h el a go r d e rb a s e do nt h eA I C ,a n dt h eC B R + and CBR− are positive and
negative shocks in the policy rates respectively. The long-run asymmetric multipliers are computed
as follows:









11Since the two techniques for testing for stationarity are widely explored in several empirical studies, the theoretical
underpinning behind them will not be discussed here. See Brooks (2008: 318-322).









However, it is possible that a combination of two or more non-stationary series may be stationary.
In this case the series are said to be conitegrated and results obtained from estimating equation 2
using OLS will no longer be spurious. Thus before estimating equation 3, series are ﬁrst tested for
cointegration. If cointegration exists then the analysis of interest rate pass-through will be based on
the Error Correction Model.
This study used the Engle and Granger (EG) approach. Since each model has only two variables
(the policy rate and the bank rate), there is at most one cointegrating vector, thus invalidating
the strenth of the likelihood approach in identifying multiple vectors. Secondly, since IRPT is
concerned with analysing the transmission of exogenously and discretionarily determined policy
rates to endogenous retail rates, simultaneity/reverse causality is strongly ruled out. A potential
criticism of the EG approach is the potential lack of power in the unit root tests, but in the current
case, complementary tests using the cointegration regression Durbin-Watson and error correlation
based tests are used to ensure robustness of the EG results.
The EG technique involves estimating the long-run equation (2), then testing whether the esti-
mated residuals obtained are stationary. Where the residuals are stationary the variables are coin-
tegrated. The CRDW technique compares the Durbin-Watson (d) values computed from estimating
the potentially cointegrating regression equation (2) to some critical values under the hypotheses
that d =0o rd = 2. If the computed d statistic is greater than the critical values, then the series
in the potentially cointegrating regression are cointegrated. The critical values are: 1% (0.511),
5% (0.386), 10% (0.322) (Gujarati, 1995: 726). Lastly, error-correction-based cointegration tests
whether potentially cointegrating series have a statistically signiﬁcant error correction term (see
Kremers, 1989; Hendry and Ericson, 1991; Artis and Zhang, 1998). Since the LR pass-through and
the asymmetry in pass-through are determined based on the error correlation model, it is important
to give more attention to the error-correction-based test.
Assuming that cointegration exists between the central bank rate and the retail rates, a dynamic
model that ties any short-run disequilibria to the long-run equilibrium can be represented as follows:






λj∆RRt−j + ϕ(RRt−1 − CBRt−1)+εt (8)
where is the error correction term [i.e. residual from OLS estimation equation (2)], whose co-
eﬃcient, φ is a measure of degree of monthly adjustment towards long run equilibrium. The error
correction cointegration test involves testing whether φ is statistically diﬀerent from zero, in which
case cointegration is said to exist between the oﬃcial rate and the retail rate. As Aziakpono et al.
(2007) note, a negative and statistically signiﬁcant φ would imply that any short-run deviation of
the oﬃcial and retail rate from their long-run equilibrium is corrected in the adjustment of bank
rates.
Once an error correction is calculated it is possible to ascertain the speed at which the bank
rates adjust back to equilibrium after a change in oﬃcial rates. This is done by computing mean
adjustment lags which, in the context of the study, can be interpreted as indicating the speed of
the IRPT. Whereas the error correction term shows the adjustment towards equilibrium within a
month, the MALs show the total time taken (speed) to return to equilibrium. Following Doornik
and Hendry (1994), the MAL is calculated from equation (8) as follows:
MAL=( 1− δ1)/ϕ (9)
In the case of monthly data the MAL presents how many months it takes for the change in
central bank rates to be fully12 reﬂected in bank lending and deposit rates. If the mean adjustment
12The word “fully” refers to the complete LR impact rather than a full reﬂection of the change in the central bank
rate, i.e. if LR adjustment is only 80% then the MAL shows how long after the initial response in the bank rate it
takes for the full 80% response to be reﬂected.
8lag is high, then there is a high rigidity/slow adjustment in the response of bank rates to policy rate
changes. The opposite would be true with a low mean adjustment lag, suggesting low rigidity/fast
adjustment of bank rates to policy rate changes.
These MALs are more correctly described as symmetric MALs as they reﬂect the response of
bank rates whether they are above or below their equilibrium level. Computing asymmetric lags
would show how long it takes bank rates to adjust up to equilibrium and down to equilibrium. These
asymmetric MALs would eﬀectively show how fast bank rates adjust upwards and downwards. To
determine the asymmetric eﬀects Scholnik (1996) suggests the separation of the residuals (here
marked as) from the cointegrating equation into two series and, where:
EC+ = EC, if EC > μ
EC+ =0 if EC < μ
and
EC− = EC, if EC < μ (10)
EC− =0 if EC > μ
where μ is the mean of the error correction which is equal to zero, since it is the residual series
of the cointegrating equation. When a residual is above its mean it can be interpreted as the bank
lending/deposit rates being above their equilibrium level with the policy rates and consequently
expected to move down to equilibrium. Conversely, when the residual is below its mean it can be
interpreted as the bank lending/deposit rates being below their equilibrium level with policy rates
and consequently expected to move back up to equilibrium. By splitting the residuals it is now
possible to observe the speed of adjustment up or down for lending and deposit rates after central
bank rate changes. Once the residuals are split into two series an asymmetric error correction system
is calculated from which the asymmetric MALs can be calculated. The asymmetric error correction
equation is presented as follows:






λ∆RRt−i + ϕ1EC+ + ϕ2EC− + εkt (11)
The relevant asymmetric mean adjustment lags become:
MAL+ =( 1− δ1)/ϕ1 (12)
and
MAL− =( 1− δ1)/ϕ2 (13)
The mean adjustment lags in equations 12 and 13 show the asymmetric adjustment in bank
lending and deposit rates when they are above and below equilibrium respectively. If the mean lags
are diﬀerent then the adjustments of the bank rates can be seen to be diﬀerent. However, whether
or not true asymmetry exists requires the use of the Wald test with a distribution on the restriction
that equations 7 and 8 are in fact equal13. If the Wald test reveals asymmetric responses when
residuals are above equilibrium (and bank rates are pushed to move down) and when residuals are
below equilibrium (and bank rates are pushed to move up) then it can be concluded that bank rates
will adjust diﬀerently during periods of expansionary monetary policy, when bank rates are expected
to rise, and during contractionary monetary policy when bank rates are expected to fall, as indicated
in the theory discussed earlier.
13The Wald test works on the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients of the asymmetric error correction terms (R+
and R− in equation 6) are not statistically diﬀerent from zero. Rejecting this null suggests that the responses of bank
r a t e st oi m p u l s e st om o v edown to equilibrium and up to equilibrium are in fact asymmetric.
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5.1 Data and data sources
The measure of bank concentration utilised in this study is the three-ﬁrm banking concentration
ratio (CR3)14. While data choice in Africa is subject to the major constraint of data availability, the
CR3 measure was used not only for its availability but also for its common use in empirical analysis
(cf. Berstein and Fuentes, 2005 and Abbasoglu et al., 2005)15. The data is for the period 1994-2007
for Botswana (BOTS), Nigeria (NIG), South Africa (RSA) and Zambia (ZAM). The countries and
sample periods were selected primarily according to data availability. The data is sourced largely
from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) CD ROM 2009, Central Bank Reports and the
New Database on Financial Development and Structure 2007 (Beck et al., 2007 and World Bank,
2009).
5.2 Stationarity and Cointegration Test Results
The results are reported in Table A1 (in Appendix). Most the series were I(1), although in rare
circumstances some series were I(0)(a fact that did not materially change the analysis). The coin-
tegration analysis was done for the entire period and in 8-year rolling windows. Results for both
the entire period and the rolling windows, along with corresponding average concentration ratios
(and their rankings16), are reported in Table A2. Given that three tests of cointegration are used,
the procedure in deciding if series are cointegrated follows Kremers et al. (1992), who suggests that
cointegration exists when one of the tests conﬁrm cointegration at least at a 5% level of signiﬁcance
or at least two of the tests conﬁrm cointegration at 10% level of signiﬁcance.
Starting with the entire period, the cointegration results show strong evidence of cointegration
in South Africa and Zambia, where all the tests identify cointegration at least at the 5% level
of signiﬁcance for both lending and deposit rates. In the case of Nigeria, deposit and lending
rate cointegration is conﬁrmed by only two of the tests. Botswana has the weakest evidence of
cointegration for both lending and deposit rates and the cointegration is only identiﬁed by the ECM
coeﬃcient test. Particularly noticeable in the results is that the coeﬃcient of the ECM strongly
conﬁrms the presence of cointegration in all the countries, for both lending and deposit rates, at a
1% level of signiﬁcance. This is important given Artis and Zhang’s (1998: 5) assertion that the ECM
statistic for testing cointegration can generate more powerful tests than those based on the ADF
and CRDW statistics. For this reason the results still demonstrate strong evidence of cointegration
even where the ECM test is the only one to conﬁrm its presence. Noteworthy is that the pattern of
concentration does not seem to be related to the existence of cointegration in the series. For instance,
South Africa, whose bank concentration level is marginally lower than that of Botswana (with the
highest bank concentration), has the strongest and Botswana has the weakest cointegration results,
while Nigeria, with the lowest bank concentration level, also has stronger cointegration results than
Botswana. Moreover, changes in average bank concentration across the rolling periods also do not
seem to be systematically related to the cointegration results in any of the countries or across
countries.
14The 3-ﬁrm concentration ratio (CR3) is calculated as follows: CR3=(
3 S
i=1
Zi)/Zt,w h e r eZi is the value of the
assets held by an individual bank and Zt is the total number of assets in the industry. Appendix Table A0 shows
the concentration levels in the four countries for the entire period and for 8-year rolling windows. Here the choice of
concentration measure was dictated by the data that was available.
15Furthermore, the commonality of its use allows the comparability of the analysis across industries, countries and
time periods. With a myriad of concentration measures capturing varying elements of market structure it is essential
that measures used must be suﬃciently common to allow comparison of results to other studies (Jordán, 2003).
16The rolling windows are ranked according to their average level of bank concentration so that for each country
there is an 8 year period demarcated as the most concentrated, that is “1”, all through to one demarcated the least
concentrated, that is “7”.
10One explanation for these results is that IRPT hinges on more than just the level of bank
concentration: other factors, such as the ownership of the banks, legislation and bank supervision,
may determine whether there is a long-run relationship between policy rates and bank lending and
deposit rates (cf. Allen and Gale, 2003).
W h a tt h ea n a l y s i so nt h et w ol e v e l ss u g g e s t si st hat bank concentration may not be a determining
inﬂuence in the relationship between bank and central bank rates. Put diﬀerently, whether or not
bank lending/deposit rates and central bank rates move together appears to be independent of the
level of banking sector concentration. However, more scrutiny is necessary before a comprehensive
conclusion can be drawn.
5.3 Symmetric and Asymmetric Adjustments
For the periods where cointegration was found, symmetric error correction models were estimated.
Corresponding asymmetric error correction models were also estimated to separate the error correc-
tion mechanism between periods when bank rates are above and below equilibrium. The results for
both the entire period and the rolling windows, together with the corresponding bank concentration
ratios for each period, are reported in Table A3.
In all four countries symmetric error correction for both lending and deposit rates is signiﬁcant,
as shown by the fact that all ECt−1 values are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. In addition lending
rates adjust faster than deposit rates, suggesting a greater reluctance for banks to adjust deposit
rates than lending rates. However, since this is true in all cases, regardless of the level of bank
concentration, we can see that whether or not the lending rate adjustments are faster than deposit
rate adjustments is not related to the level of concentration. This result is in line with the intuition,
that since lending rates represent returns on assets (loans) and deposit rates represent expenditure
on liabilities (deposits), banks would adjust lending rates faster than they would deposit rates,
regardless of the level of concentration. In addition, it can be seen that the speed of adjustment is
not related to the level of concentration. For example, Botswana, with the greatest concentration,
has the slowest adjustment of lending rates, while Nigeria has the least concentrated banking industry
and the third slowest adjustment of lending rates.
In the case of rolling windows, as expected, the results in all periods in which no cointegration is
identiﬁed, and the error correction is computed to perform the ECM coeﬃcient test, show that there
is no statistically signiﬁcant error correction both symmetrically and asymmetrically. For example,
in Botswana for the periods 1999-2006 and 2000-2007, there is no evidence of cointegration and
the corresponding ECM values are not signiﬁcant. However, in so far as the symmetric adjustment
is concerned there are some intuitively unappealing results in which cointegration is identiﬁed and
yet the corresponding error correction is not signiﬁcant. In the symmetric error correction this
is the case for South Africa 1999-2006(1), Botswana’s deposit rate 1998-2005(7) and lending rates
1995-2002(4) and 1997-2004(6), and Zambia’s deposit rate 1998-2005(7). According to Gonzalo
and Lee (2000), it is possible to observe such a conﬂicting outcome in cases where the underlying
series are fractionally integrated. In such cases the series are not actually I(1),a si d e n t i ﬁed by
the stationarity/unit root tests. Consequently, the cointegration results on such series are in fact
spurious. In all cases, however, there is no pattern between the changes in the bank concentration
and the size or signiﬁcance of the symmetric error correction.
In terms of the asymmetric error correction, there are fewer periods in which both the asymmetric
error correction terms are signiﬁcant than periods in which at least one of them is not signiﬁcant.
Neither in the size nor signiﬁcance of the positive (EC
+
t−1) and negative error correction (EC
−
t−1)
is there a clear relationship between bank concentration and the error correction mechanism of the
cointegrated series.
115.4 Speed of Adjustment: Mean Adjustment Lags
While the error correction coeﬃcients show by how much bank rates adjust back to equilibrium
in each month, they do not show how long the complete adjustment will take. To determine the
speed of the adjustment of the bank rates to central bank rate changes the study computes the mean
adjustment lags as described in the analytical framework. Both the symmetric and asymmetric mean
adjustments are computed. The average levels of concentration for each of the periods in each of
the four countries are then compared to the mean adjustment to evaluate if there is any systematic
relationship between the two. The results for both the entire sample period and the rolling windows
period are reported in Table A4.
Starting with the results for the entire period, Botswana has the highest level of concentration
and the largest symmetric MAL/slowest adjustment for both deposit and lending rates. After a
shock to the equilibrium relationship it takes on average 2.6 months (approximately 78 days) and
1.7 months (approximately 50 days) for deposit rates and lending rates respectively to return to
equilibrium. It follows that for a discernable relationship to be seen between bank concentration and
the speed of adjustment, the country with the lowest concentration must have the fastest symmetric
adjustment/lowest MAL. However, despite having the lowest level of concentration Nigeria does
not have the smallest MALs. The fastest adjustment for both deposit and lending rates occurs in
South Africa where, despite having the second highest level of concentration, it takes 0.7 months
(approximately 19 days) and 0.5 months (approximately 13 days) for deposit rates and lending rates
respectively to return to equilibrium. This analysis does not show a relationship between the level
of concentration and the symmetric adjustment of bank lending/deposit rates to central bank rate
changes.
In the case of the asymmetric adjustment, high bank concentration seems to be associated with
slow adjustment down to equilibrium in lending rates. Botswana, with the most concentrated
banking sector, has the slowest adjustment of lending rates, followed by Zambia and then Nigeria,
which has the least concentrated banking sector. This suggests that that the more concentrated
the banking industry the slower the speed in the reduction of lending rates back to equilibrium,
This is evidence in support of the Structure-Conduct-Performance hypothesis which suggests that
concentrated markets are susceptible to collusion which would slow down proﬁt-reducing reductions
in lending rates. This evidence supports the ﬁndings of Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) which also
identify evidence in support of SCP in the banking industries of EU countries. However, some
caution is necessary in drawing conclusions on thes results as this relationship exists in the absence
of a signiﬁcant MAL+ for South Africa, which had the fastest symmetric adjustment. In contrast to
the speed of downward adjustment in lending rates, the speedds of downward adjustment of deposits
(MAL+) and the upward adjustment of both lending and deposit rates (MAL−)d on o ts e e mt ob e
related to bank concentration across the countries.
As for the rolling windows results, South Africa does not present evidence of a clear relationship
between changing bank concentration and either a slower or faster symmetric speed of adjustment.
For the same reason as the analysis of the entire period, no relationship is observable as increasing
bank concentration is not clearly associated with increases or decreases in the mean adjustment
lags17. The result is the same for adjustments up to equilibrium (MAL+) and adjustments down
to equilibrium (MAL−). However, as may be expected, the impulses for proﬁt-boosting increases in
lending rates are faster than the impulses to red u c et h e m . O fi n t e r e s ti nt h ec a s eo fS o u t hA f r i c a
is that deposit rates adjust faster to impulses to increase than decrease, providing support for the
adverse consumer reaction hypothesis. However, again, while some support for this theory may
exist, there is still no evidence of a relationship between both the symmetric and asymmetric speed
of adjustment and the level of bank concentration.
In Botswana the symmetric adjustments are larger than in South Africa, suggesting that both
17If increasing bank concentration was associated with either larger or smaller MALs then it would be clear that a
pattern/relationship is present between bank concentration and the speed of the IRPT, as represented by the MALs.
12lending and deposit rates adjusted more slowly inB o t s w a n at h a ni nS o u t hA f r i c a( w i t ht h el o w e r
concentration of the two). However, Nigeria, with the lowest concentration, has slower adjustments
than more concentrated South Africa and Zambia, which quashes the possibility of a relationship.
Nevertheless, within Botswana there is an indication that bank concentration is negatively related
to the speed of adjustment of deposit rates symmetrically and when they are above equilibrium
(and the impulse is for them to fall). This relationship is identiﬁable in the three most concentrated
periods where the reduction in concentration is associated with slower symmetric and negative
adjustments of deposit rates. The relationship between the asymmetric response and the level of
bank concentration is not observable as the asymmetric mean adjustment lags are not signiﬁcant in
t h es a m ep e r i o d sf o rM A L + and MAL− , for both lending and deposit rates, except in one period.
The results for Nigeria also show some signs of a relationship. As with Botswana there is a
relationship, but in this case it is a positive relationship in the deposit rate between decreasing bank
concentration and a slower speed of adjustment in the least concentrated periods for symmetric
deposit rates, while there is a negative relationship over the same period for falling concentration
and the faster adjustment of increasing deposit rates. The symmetric and asymmetric response of
lending rates in Nigeria is not related to the level of bank concentration.
In Zambia bank concentration is negatively related to the symmetric and asymmetric mean
adjustment lags for deposit rates in the most concentrated periods. As concentration fell the time
taken for deposit rates to return to equilibrium increased, i.e. the speed of adjustment fell. This is a
similar relationship to the one identiﬁed in Botswana. However, as with Botswana, the relationship
does not hold for all the periods and so cannot be described as a distinct relationship. In terms of
the lending rates, as with the other countries in the study a clear relationship could not be identiﬁed.
The analysis of results identiﬁed traces of a relationship between bank concentration and the
symmetric and negative adjustment of deposit rates and falling lending rates, and moves on to an
investigation of the relationship between bank concentration and the magnitude of the adjustment
of bank rates in the short and long run, symmetrically and asymmetrically, in response to oﬃcial
rate changes.
5.5 Magnitude of Adjustment
As presented in Appendix A5, the short-run symmetric adjustment in deposit rates following a
change in oﬃcial rates is smallest in Nigeria, where concentration is smallest, and is at its largest in
South Africa, where concentration is highest18. Based on this, the size of the short-run adjustment
of deposit rates is positively related to bank concentration. This is to say that the greater the
concentration, the larger the size of the adjustment. However, the symmetric adjustment of lending
rates does not show a similar pattern, as the inclusion of Botswana (with the smallest adjustment)
means that no clear relationship can be seen between concentration and the size of lending rate
adjustments.
Appendix A5 also presents the long-run symmetric and asymmetric magnitudes of adjustment.
As can be seen, there is no clear pattern between concentration and the symmetric magnitude of
adjustment of lending and deposit rates. In the case of lending rates, while Nigeria has the smallest
long-run adjustment and the lowest level of concentration, the largest adjustment is not associated
with the most concentrated country (Botswana).
The symmetric long-run adjustment results are in line with the ﬁndings of the short-run results
where no clear pattern can be seen between bank concentration and either a rising or falling size of
adjustment following a positive or negative change in oﬃcial rates. However, unlike the case of the
short-run adjustments, the Wald test shows that the response is only asymmetric for lending rates in
Zambia and Nigeria, and deposit rates in Zambia (countries with the lowest level of concentration).
18Botswana is eliminated from the analysis as it does not have a statistically signiﬁc a n tv a l u ef o rt h es h o r t - r u n
adjustment. This leaves South Africa as the most concentrated country in so far as the symmetric short-run adjustment
is concerned.
13This indicates that asymmetry in the long-run adjustment of bank rates may be related to the level
of banking sector concentration.
In South Africa the symmetric adjustment of long-run lending and deposit rates is negatively re-
lated to the level of banking sector concentration in the rolling windows from 1994-2001 to 1999-2006
(lending rates) and 1995-2002 to 1999-2006 (deposit rates). Increasing concentration is associated
with lower long-run adjustments in bank rates following changes in oﬃcial rates. This is in keeping
with the SCP that suggests collusive behaviour will hinder the full reﬂection of changes in oﬃcial
rates in bank rates.
In Botswana the only sign of a relationship between the symmetric long-run adjustment and bank
rate adjustment can be seen in lending rates in the rolling windows 1994-2001 to 1996-2003, where
falling concentration is associated with larger long-run adjustments. This is a similar relationship
to the one found in South Africa and it provides additional support for the inﬂuence of the SCP in
so far as symmetric lending rate adjustments are concerned (see Appendix). The results for Nigeria
do not give any evidence of a relationship between concentration and the symmetric adjustment
of both lending and deposit rates. In contrast the evidence from Zambia is similar to the ﬁndings
for Botswana and South Africa, where a relationship can be seen between falling concentration and
larger symmetric magnitude of adjustments for lending rates.
In so far as the relationship between the level of concentration and the asymmetric response of
the long-run magnitude of adjustment is concerned, there is some evidence of a relationship with the
positive long-run adjustment and none with the negative long-run adjustment. Falling concentration
is associated with larger long-run adjustments in deposit rates following both increases (LR+) and
decreases (LR-) in the oﬃcial rate. The results for lending rates do not depict any relationship.
In Botswana the only evidence of a relationship between the asymmetric adjustments and the level
of concentration is in the lending rates. Over the sample period a falling level of bank concentration
is associated with a larger long-run positive adjustment in lending rates following a positive change in
the oﬃcial rate. In Nigeria there is evidence that the positive long-run adjustments of both lending
and deposit rates are related to the level of banking sector concentration. In the rolling windows
1996-2003 to 1999-2006, decreases in the level of concentration were associated with increases in
the size of the positive long-run adjustment of deposit rates, while in the rolling windows 1994-
2001 and 1995-2002 falling concentration is associated with a decreasing size in the positive long-run
adjustment of lending rates. In Zambia the positive long-run adjustment of lending rates is positively
related to the level of concentration. As the concentration level falls the size of the positive long-run
adjustment also falls. Of particular importance is that in all four countries, whether the size of the
negative adjustment is smaller or bigger than the corresponding positive adjustment for deposit and
lending rates, it is not related to the level of banking sector concentration.
6 CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The paper analysed the relationship between bank concentration and interest rate pass-through in
four sub-Saharan countries. It also analysed whether bank retail rates responded asymmetrically to
changes in the oﬃcial rate and whether this asymmetry was associated with the levels or changes
in bank concentration. The analysis was done both for the entire period (to see whether a country
with the highest concentration has the most eﬀective monetary policy transmission or otherwise)
and eight year rolling windows (to trace whether the dynamic responses in pass-through are linked
to changes in average bank concentration). The ﬁndings of the study are as follows:
Regarding the speed of adjustment, there is evidence that, in some cases, bank concentration
is related to the speed of the IRPT. In the analysis of the entire period there is evidence of a
negative relationship between bank concentration and speed of lending rate adjustments down to
equilibrium, suggesting that the greater the concentration, the slower the reduction in lending rates
by banks following a change in oﬃcial rates. Put diﬀerently, bank concentration can be seen to
14impede expansionary monetary policy when lending rates are expected to fall. However, once the
analysis is moved to the rolling windows, the trend over time suggests a relationship only in the
adjustment of deposit rates. In addition, where the trend over time shows a relationship between
bank concentration and the symmetric and negative adjustment of deposit rates, the nature of the
relationship is not consistent. In Botswana and Zambia the relationship is a negative one, suggesting
that greater bank concentration results in slower adjustments of deposit rates, while in Nigeria it is
a positive one, suggesting that greater bank concent r a t i o ni sa s s o c i a t e dw i t hf a s t e ra d j u s t m e n t si n
deposit rates. In addition, the evidence from the Wald tests shows that bank concentration is not
related to the presence of asymmetry in the speed of adjustment of both lending and deposit rates.
This result is the same for the analysis of the entire period and the analysis through the rolling
windows.
In so far as the magnitude of the adjustment is concerned; there is more evidence to suggest a
relationship with bank concentration than there is to suggest a relationship between bank concentra-
tion and the speed of the IRPT. There is a positive relationship between the symmetric adjustment
of deposit rates and the level of bank concentration in the analysis of the entire period. This analysis
also shows a relationship between falling concentration and larger long-run negative adjustments in
lending rates, which suggests that the responsiveness of banks to monetary policy impulses to re-
duce lending rates is negatively aﬀected by bank concentration. In other words, bank concentration
stiﬂes the magnitude of the IRPT and by implication the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy. In the
rolling window analysis the evidence suggests a relationship with deposit rates as well. However, in
some cases the relationships are positive while in others they are negative, suggesting that there is
no consistent relationship between bank concentration and the magnitude of the IRPT in both the
short run and the long run, symmetrically or asymmetrically. In some cases there is evidence that
supports the Structure Conduct Performance hypothesis while in others there is evidence supporting
the Eﬃcient Structure Hypothesis.
It is important to note that the relationships were not consistent between the countries and
across the two levels of analysis. This suggests that the relationships were either not the natural
outcome of bank concentration changes and IRPT (supporting researchers such as Van Leuvensteijn
et al., 2008) or that there are some mitigating factors that are preventing the observation of the
relationship. While the true explanation may still be debated, what is clear in the evidence is
that bank concentration is not consistently related to the speed and magnitude of the IRPT. As a
result, while the results show that bank concentration can be negatively and positively related to the
speed and magnitude of the IRPT it should not be expected that greater concentration will either
automatically retard or accelerate the IRPT and make monetary policy transmission any more or
any less eﬀective. Additionally, the fact that the relationships observed between bank concentration
and the IRPT cannot be captured neatly by one hypothesis suggests that the inﬂuence of bank
concentration will not be universal, but will capture the trend within a country at a speciﬁct i m e .
Consequently, trying to identify a single relationship will continue to provide inconclusive results
where the reality is that bank concentration can be related to the IRPT in diﬀerent ways in diﬀerent
countries at diﬀerent times.
The most important implication of these results is that the African trend towards bank con-
solidation (in line with the global trend noted earlier) is not to be regarded with alarm in so far
as eﬀective monetary policy is concerned. Simply because concentration is likely to increase is not
to say that the IRPT will weaken or monetary policy will be less eﬀective. However, this is not a
vindication of proponents of increased bank consolidation and concentration. Such a conclusion can
only be informed in part by this study because there are still other concerns around the operation
of highly concentrated markets, for example, the potential abuse of market power access to ﬁnancial
capital.
As competition commissions consider legislation relating to policy on acceptable mergers, ac-
quisitions and consolidation exercises in the banking industry they may now do so informed of the
fact that the evidence in the selected African countries in this study is that the level of banking
15concentration can be, but is not always, related to the either the strength or weakness of the IRPT
of policy changes to bank deposit and lending rates.
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Table 1: Correlation of the Central Bank Rate with Deposit Rate and Lending Rate 
 
Botswana 
(BOTS)  Nigeria (NIG) 
South Africa 







Rate  Central Bank Rate 
Central Bank Rate  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 
Deposit Rate  0.1930  0.7847  0.9780  0.9769 
Lending Rate  0.8717  0.8623  0.9931  0.9928 
 
 





















































All the graphs in Figure 1 are constructed from the IMF International Financial Statistics (2009 CD Rom). The y-axis 
marks the interest rates while the x-axis marks the year 
 
Figure 2:  Bank Concentration 
 





  APPENDIX    
 
   TABLE A0: ROLLING WINDOW CONCENTRATION LEVELS    
 
 
SOUTH AFRICA    BOTSWANA    NIGERIA    ZAMBIA 
ppendix Tabl  CR3 
Period 
 















0.82997    7    0.96702    1    0.49582    1    0.74408    1 
0.83617    6    0.95926    2    0.44532    2    0.70881    2 
0.86107    5    0.94289    3    0.41283    3    0.68047    3 
0.87434    4    0.91888    4    0.40161    4    0.65875    4 
0.88949    2    0.89482    5    0.40032    5    0.62463    5 
0.89341    1    0.87105    6    0.40248    6    0.61076    6 
0.88331    3    0.84487    7    0.40133    7    0.59941    7   
Key: 
Significant at 1% (*), 5% (**), 10% (***) 
 
A1: STATIONARITY  and UNIT ROOT TESTS 
 
ADF (H: 0 ~ Unit Root) Critical Values: 1% (-3.464643), 5% (-2.876515), 10% (-2.574831) 
KPSS (H: 0 ~ Stationarity) Critical Values: 1% (0.739), 5% (0.463), 10% (0.347) 
 
TABLE A-1: RSA (Stationarity/Unit Root Test) 
DEPOSIT RATE  LENDING RATE  BANK RATE 
ADF    KPSS    ADF    KPSS    ADF  KPSS 
Level    1st Diff    Level    1st Diff    Level    1st Diff    Level    1st Diff    Level    1st Diff    Level    1st Diff 
1994-2001    -1.944    -4.724*    0.442*  0.212*    -1.405    -6.349*  0.374*  0.260*    -1.388  -5.951*    0.343*    0.278* 
1995-2002    -2.011    -4.924*    0.738    0.117*    -1.623    -6.671*    0.640*    0.126*    -1.64  -6.299*    0.621*    0.621* 
1996-2003    -1.676    -7.017*    0.875    0.095*    -1.595    -4.361*  0.812    0.108*    -1.048  -6.123*    0.834    0.118* 
1997-2004    -1.392    -7.037*    0.913    0.050*    -1.745    -4.156*  0.882    0.056*    -1.235  -6.072*    0.939    0.055* 
1998-2005    -1.557    -6.972*    0.848    0.053*    -1.368    -4.437*  0.859    0.053*    -1.458  -3.848*    0.927    0.051* 
1999-2006    -2.541    -6.011*    0.851    0.323*    -1.974    -3.231*  0.887    0.285*    -1.965  -3.236**    0.982    0.266* 
2000-2007    -1.304    -6.014*    0.463*  0.221*    -2.206    -2.644*  0.582*    0.164*  -2.177    -2.733***    0.699*    0.170* 
1994-2007    -1.883    -6.360*    1.047    0.110*    -1.849    -5.862*  1.029    0.108*    -1.421  -2.921**    1.058    0.107* 
TABLE A-2 BOTSWANA  (Stationarity/Unit Root Test) 
DEPOSIT  RATE    LENDING  RATE    BANK RATE 
ADF    KPSS    ADF    KPSS    ADF  KPSS 
Level    1st Diff    Level    1st Diff    Level    1st Diff    Level    1st Diff    Level    1st Diff    Level    1st Diff 
1994-2001    -2.078    -7.294*    0.423*    0.252*  -0.941    -10.079*    0.759  0.130*  -1.474    -14.232*    0.366*    0.149* 
1995-2002    -3.511*    -14.929*    0.390*    0.219*  0.287    -8.187*    0.955  0.218*  -0.552    -12.669*    0.711*    0.403* 
1996-2003    -1.517    -9.124*    0.571*  0.103*    -0.823    -8.563*  1.073    0.151*    -1.041  -13.142*    1.083    0.115* 
1997-2004    -1.649    -9.592*    0.719    0.077*    -1.218    -8.919*  1.051    0.170*    -1.397  -13.365*    1.066    0.127* 
1998-2005    -1.659    -10.316*    0.549*  0.120*    -2.547    -9.295*    0.846    0.407*    -2.53  -13.544*    0.863    0.236* 
1999-2006    -1.778    -10.258*    0.330*  0.275*    -2.547    -9.585*  0.640*    0.212*  -1.984    -14.028*    0.641*    0.086* 
2000-2007    -1.28    -10.240*    0.774    0.214*    -2.177    -8.924*    0.319*    0.129*  -3.289**  -13.960*    0.349*  0.060* 
1994-2007    -1.924    -8.013*    0.713    0.313*    -2.59***    -14.135*    1.417  0.129*  -2.80***    -16.164*    0.807    0.083* 
TABLE A-3 NIGERIA  (Stationarity/Unit Root Test) 
DEPOSIT  RATE    LENDING  RATE    BANK RATE 
ADF    KPSS    ADF    KPSS    ADF  KPSS 
Level    1st Diff    Level    1st Diff    Level    1st Diff    Level    1st Diff    Level    1st Diff    Level    1st Diff 
1994-2001  -2.116  -4.860*  0.211*  0.179*  0.114  -11.464*  0.499*  0.593*  -0.602  -4.081*  0.856  0.115* 
1995-2002  -2.667  -5.464*  0.428*    0.089*  -1.464  -9.591*  0.815  0.115*  -1.317  -7.305*  0.911  0.078* 
1996-2003  -1.882  -12.294*  0.631*    0.103*  -1.466  -9.708*  0.739  0.165*  -1.438  -7.972*  0.643*  0.133* 
1997-2004  -1.924  -13.056*  0.753  0.099*  -1.458  -9.977*  0.484*    0.211*  -1.549  -7.972*  0.304*  0.145* 
1998-2005  -1.601  -13.335*  0.256*  0.236*  -1.36  -9.188*  0.299*    0.376*  -1.292  -8.099*  0.295*  0.212* 
1999-2006  -1.592  -13.312*  0.350*    0.100*  -0.979  -8.469*  0.666*    0.324*  -0.625  -7.316*  0.857  0.252* 
2000-2007  -1.313  -13.805*  0.568*    0.086*  -0.698  -9.015*  0.983  0.149*  -0.627  -9.811*  0.999  0.104* 
1994-2007  -2.403  -17.491*  0.424*  0.045*  -2.113  -16.950*  0.547*  0.079*  -1.96  -13.322*  0.379*  0.056* 
TABLE A-4 ZAMBIA (Stationarity/Unit Root Test) 
DEPOSIT RATE  LENDING RATE  BANK RATE 
ADF  KPSS  ADF  KPSS  ADF  KPSS 
Level  1st Diff  Level    1st Diff  Level  1st Diff  Level  1st Diff  Level  1st Diff  Level  1st Diff 
1994-2001  -1.098  -7.764*  0.365*    0.130*  -2.036  -6.468*  0.457*    0.130*  -1.942  -6.118*  0.469*  0.143* 
1995-2002  -2.029  -4.782*  0.244*    0.155*  -1.712  -6.511*  0.266*    0.161*  -1.852  -5.932*  0.287*  0.147* 
1996-2003  1.454  -5.014*  0.624*    0.221*  -2.206  -2.944*  0.499*  0.376*  -2.177  -2.933***  0.699*  0.133* 
1997-2004  -2.515  -11.202*  0.843  0.232*  -1.362  -10.410*  0.277*  0.190*  -2.482  -12.024*  0.427*    0.296 
1998-2005  -1.814  -4.342*  0.775  0.081*  -2.263  -12.165*  0.700*  0.071*  -1.818  -9.224*  0.342*    0.087* 
1999-2006  -2.968  -11.610*  0.629*  0.096*  -2.541  -12.369*  0.537*  0.078*  -2.148  -9.137*  0.254*  0.128* 
2000-2007  -0.97  -10.842*  1.006  0.085*  -3.507*  -10.200*  0.189*  0.149*  -2.239  -9.186*  0.696*    0.167* 
1994-2007  -2.633  -8.235*  0.753  0.214*  -2.315  -9.356*  0.450*  0.156*  -2.147  -11.326*  0.452*  0.112* 
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A2: COINTEGRATION TEST RESULTS 
 
ADF McKinnon Critical values 2 variables ~ 100 observations: 1% (-4.008), 5% (-3.398), 10% (-0.3087) (Enders, 2004: 441) 
ADF McKinnon Critical values 2 variables ~ 200 observations: 1% (-3.954), 5% (-3.368), 10% (-3.067) (Enders, 2004: 441) 
CRDW critical values: 1% (0.511), 5% (0.386), 10% (0.322) (Gujarati, 1995: 726) 




Conc. Rank  Dep. Variable 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Engle and Granger Model 
ADF  CRDW  ECM coefficient     ECM (prob). 
 
7  1994-2001  Deposit Rate  -2.594  0.586*  -0.407  0.000 
6  1995-2002  Deposit Rate  -2.936  0.594*  -0.497  0.000 
5  1996-2003  Deposit Rate  -4.339*  0.658*  -0.379  0.000 
4  1997-2004  Deposit Rate  -4.883*  0.755*  -0.399  0.000 
2  1998-2005  Deposit Rate  -5.187*  0.880*  -0.392  0.000 
1  1999-2006  Deposit Rate  -3.309***  0.444**  -0.113  0.330 
3  2000-2007  Deposit Rate  -2.548  0.239  -0.055  0.569 
1994-2007  Deposit Rate  -3.443**  0.498**  -0.361  0.000 
7  1994-2001  Lending Rate  -5.389*  0.952*  -0.496  0.000 
6  1995-2002  Lending Rate  -5.198*  0.897*  -0.581  0.000 
5  1996-2003  Lending Rate  -4.890*  0.811*  -0.446  0.000 
4  1997-2004  Lending Rate  -4.891*  0.813*  -0.505  0.000 
2  1998-2005  Lending Rate  -3.487**  0.802*  -0.500  0.000 
1  1999-2006  Lending Rate  -2.061  0.402**  0.607  0.000 
3  2000-2007  Lending Rate  -1.745  0.101  -0.034  0.512 




Conc. Rank  Dep. Variable 
BOTSWANA 
Engle and Granger Model 
ADF  CRDW  ECM coefficient     ECM (prob). 
 
1  1994-2001  Deposit Rate  -2.739  0.905*  -0.408  0.000 
2  1995-2002  Deposit Rate  -5.48*  0.969*  -0.351  0.000 
3  1996-2003  Deposit Rate  -2.647  0.281  -0.013  0.907 
4  1997-2004  Deposit Rate  -3.250  0.367***  -0.050  0.642 
5  1998-2005  Deposit Rate  -3.945**  0.503**  -0.039  0.717 
6  1999-2006  Deposit Rate  -1.674  0.172  -0.082  0.432 
7  2000-2007  Deposit Rate  -1.284  0.106  -0.100  0.347 
1994-2007  Deposit Rate  -1.819  0.137  -0.347  0.000 
1  1994-2001  Lending Rate  -2.154  0.431**  -0.239  0.004 
2  1995-2002  Lending Rate  -4.543*  0.558*  -0.152  0.110 
3  1996-2003  Lending Rate  -9.353*  1.927*  -0.257  0.026 
4  1997-2004  Lending Rate  -9.343*  1.925*  0.011  0.887 
5  1998-2005  Lending Rate  -9.415*  1.908*  -0.267  0.014 
6  1999-2006  Lending Rate  -9.915*  1.768*  -0.234  0.038 
7  2000-2007  Lending Rate  -8.965*  1.824*  -0.505  0.000 




Conc. Rank  Dep. Variable 
NIGERIA 
Engle and Granger Model 
ADF  CRDW  ECM coefficient     ECM (prob). 
 
1  1994-2001  Deposit Rate  -2.132  0.214  -0.241  0.020 
2  1995-2002  Deposit Rate  -2.065  0.267  -0.308  0.005 
3  1996-2003  Deposit Rate  -2.402  0.376***  -0.330  0.002 
4  1997-2004  Deposit Rate  -2.471  0.427**  -0.313  0.003 
5  1998-2005  Deposit Rate  -2.504  0.494**  -0.443  0.000 
6  1999-2006  Deposit Rate  -2.589  0.501**  -0.447  0.000 
7  2000-2007  Deposit Rate  -2.528  0.489**  -0.428  0.000 
1994-2007  Deposit Rate  -3.4**  0.319  -0.392  0.000 
1  1994-2001  Lending Rate  -1.641  0.181  -0.134  0.049 
2  1995-2002  Lending Rate  -2.624  0.262  -0.146  0.119 
3  1996-2003  Lending Rate  -2.867  0.306  -0.158  0.100 
4  1997-2004  Lending Rate  -3.000  0.348  -0.156  0.108 
5  1998-2005  Lending Rate  -2.798  0.298  -0.084  0.451 
6  1999-2006  Lending Rate  -2.727  0.317  -0.073  0.420 
7  2000-2007  Lending Rate  -3.7**  0.368***  -0.043  0.623 






Conc. Rank  Dep. Variable 
ZAMBIA 
Engle and Granger Model 
ADF  CRDW  ECM coefficient     ECM (prob). 
 
1  1994-2001  Deposit Rate  -2.383  0.248  -0.242  0.026 
2  1995-2002  Deposit Rate  -2.134  0.235  -0.305  0.004 
3  1996-2003  Deposit Rate  -3.865**  0.703*  -0.563  0.000 
4  1997-2004  Deposit Rate  -2.578  0.578*  -0.394  0.000 
5  1998-2005  Deposit Rate  -1.983  0.456**  -0.437  0.000 
6  1999-2006  Deposit Rate  -1.981  0.465**  -0.399  0.000 
7  2000-2007  Deposit Rate  -2.548  0.239  0.032  0.000 
1994-2007  Deposit Rate  -3.865**  0.483**  -0.334  0.000 
1  1994-2001  Lending Rate  -2.636  0.489**  -0.441  0.000 
2  1995-2002  Lending Rate  -3.4**  0.430**  -0.435  0.000 
3  1996-2003  Lending Rate  -3.201*  0.374***  -0.353  0.000 
4  1997-2004  Lending Rate  -1.606  0.386**  -0.344  0.002 
5  1998-2005  Lending Rate  -7.032*  1.377*  -1.112  0.000 
6  1999-2006  Lending Rate  -5.823*  1.082*  -0.537  0.000 
7  2000-2007  Lending Rate  -1.745  0.101  -0.911  0.000 
1994-2007  Lending Rate  -5.45*  0.920*  -0.462  0.000 
 
A3: ERROR CORRECTION RESULTS 
∆BR is the change in the central bank/policy rate 
∆Deposit Rate representes change in the deposit rate 
∆Lending Rate represents change in the lending rate 
The symmetric error correction coefficient is denoted by ECt-1 
The asymmetric error correction coefficient representing adjustments down to equilibrium is denoted by EC 
+
 






+  - 
Conc. Rank  Dep. Variable  Constant  Prob.  ∆BR  Prob.  ECt-1       Prob.     EC  t-1      Prob.     EC t-1       Prob. 
  SOUTH AFRICA  
7  1994-2001  ∆Deposit Rate  0.000  0.996  0.782  0.000  -0.407  0.000        
   
∆Deposit Rate  -0.041  0.618  0.777  0.000     
-0.325  0.037  -0.542  0.012 
6  1995-2002  ∆Deposit Rate  -0.017  0.767  0.759  0.000  -0.497  0.000        
   
∆Deposit Rate  -0.026  0.727  0.759  0.000     
-0.473  0.007  -0.535  0.023 
5  1996-2003  ∆Deposit Rate  -0.045  0.439  0.759  0.000  -0.379  0.000        
   
∆Deposit Rate  -0.073  0.366  0.760  0.000     
-0.319  0.049  -0.466  0.025 
4  1997-2004  ∆Deposit Rate  -0.071  0.221  0.767  0.000  -0.399  0.000        
   
∆Deposit Rate  -0.101  0.189  0.769  0.000     
-0.328  0.042  -0.499  0.013 
2  1998-2005  ∆Deposit Rate  -0.055  0.343  0.779  0.000  -0.392  0.000        
   
∆Deposit Rate  -0.079  0.302  0.781  0.000     
-0.336  0.039  -0.472  0.020 
1  1999-2006  ∆Deposit Rate  -0.013  0.690  0.613  0.000  -0.113  0.330        
   
∆Deposit Rate  0.030  0.396  0.566  0.000     
-0.285  0.293  0.174  0.311 
 
1994-2007  ∆Deposit Rate  0.005  0.899  0.771  0.000  -0.361  0.000        
   
∆Deposit Rate  -0.010  0.839  0.772  0.000     
-0.322  0.007  -0.419  0.006 
7  1994-2001  ∆Lending Rate  -0.033  0.480  0.741  0.000  -0.496  0.000        
   
∆Lending Rate  -0.182  0.001  0.682  0.000     
0.294  0.166  -0.964  0.000 
6  1995-2002  ∆Lending Rate  -0.002  0.968  0.768  0.000  -0.581  0.000        
   
∆Lending Rate  -0.124  0.056  0.725  0.000     
-0.023  0.926  -0.653  0.025 
5  1996-2003  ∆Lending Rate  -0.037  0.420  0.807  0.000  -0.446  0.000        
   
∆Lending Rate  -0.188  0.001  0.749  0.000     
-0.347  0.115  -0.899  0.000 
4  1997-2004  ∆Lending Rate  -0.052  0.229  0.792  0.000  -0.505  0.000        
   
∆Lending Rate  -0.200  0.000  0.725  0.000     
-0.514  0.040  -0.926  0.000 
2  1998-2005  ∆Lending Rate  -0.045  0.294  0.790  0.000  -0.500  0.000        
   
∆Lending Rate  -0.203  0.000  0.720  0.000     
-0.558  0.029  -0.929  0.000 
1  1999-2006  ∆Lending Rate  -0.011  0.594  0.869  0.000  0.607  0.000        
   
∆Lending Rate  -0.006  0.825  0.866  0.000     
-0.661  0.000  -0.542  0.008 
 
1994-2007  ∆Lending Rate  0.000  0.997  0.820  0.000  -0.435  0.000        
   
∆Lending Rate  -0.093  0.004  0.790  0.000     





Conc. Rank    Dep. Variable    Constant  Prob.    ∆BR    Prob.  ECt-1        Prob.     EC  t-1      Prob.     EC t-1       Prob. 
  BOTSWANA   
1  1994-2001  ∆Deposit Rate  -0.036  0.563  -0.136  0.456  -0.408  0.000        
   
∆Deposit Rate  0.119  0.042  -0.044  0.775     
-1.108  0.000  0.067  0.556 
2  1995-2002  ∆Deposit Rate  0.001  0.978  0.070  0.653  -0.351  0.000        
   
∆Deposit Rate  0.120  0.004  0.073  0.549     
-1.181  0.000  0.069  0.444 
4  1997-2004  ∆Deposit Rate  0.003  0.912  0.067  0.374  -0.050  0.642        
   
∆Deposit Rate  0.022  0.446  0.066  0.375     
-0.190  0.238  0.120  0.507 
5  1998-2005  ∆Deposit Rate  -0.005  0.850  0.063  0.422  -0.039  0.717        
   
∆Deposit Rate  0.009  0.754  0.061  0.438     
-0.145  0.389  0.069  0.683 
 
1994-2007  ∆Deposit Rate  -0.015  0.657  0.100  0.373  -0.347  0.000        
   
∆Deposit Rate  0.093  0.156  0.144  0.007     
-0.891  0.000  0.079  0.378 
1  1994-2001  ∆Lending Rate  0.022  0.183  0.102  0.050  -0.239  0.004        
   
∆Lending Rate  0.023  0.221  0.104  0.052     
-0.260  0.073  -0.228  0.032 
2  1995-2002  ∆Lending Rate  0.030  0.053  0.159  0.003  -0.152  0.110        
   
∆Lending Rate  0.022  0.211  0.147  0.007     
-0.063  0.648  -0.256  0.088 
3  1996-2003  ∆Lending Rate  0.017  0.320  0.264  0.000  -0.257  0.026        
   
∆Lending Rate  0.003  0.856  0.242  0.000     
-0.107  0.477  -0.515  0.013 
4  1997-2004  ∆Lending Rate  0.015  0.368  0.206  0.000  0.011  0.887        
   
∆Lending Rate  0.007  0.689  0.219  0.000     
-0.094  0.517  -0.459  0.018 
5  1998-2005  ∆Lending Rate  0.030  0.058  0.245  0.000  -0.267  0.014        
   
∆Lending Rate  0.017  0.332  0.225  0.000     
-0.124  0.375  -0.526  0.009 
6  1999-2006  ∆Lending Rate  0.026  0.069  0.278  0.000  -0.234  0.038        
   
∆Lending Rate  0.025  0.121  0.276  0.000     
-0.220  0.143  -0.256  0.211 
7  2000-2007  ∆Lending Rate  0.005  0.667  0.388  0.000  -0.505  0.000        
   
∆Lending Rate  0.000  0.984  0.384  0.000     
-0.478  0.000  -0.606  0.018 
 
1994-2007  ∆Lending Rate  0.013  0.339  0.413  0.000  -0.353  0.000        
   
∆Lending Rate  0.006  0.704  0.408  0.000     





Conc. Rank    Dep. Variable    Constant  Prob.    ∆BR    Prob.  ECt-1        Prob.     EC  t-1      Prob.     EC t-1       Prob. 
  NIGERIA   
1  1994-2001  ∆Deposit Rate  0.029  0.791  0.027  0.037  -0.241  0.020        
   
∆Deposit Rate  0.145  0.276  0.139  0.003     
-0.489  0.011  -0.079  0.582 
2  1995-2002  ∆Deposit Rate  -0.032  0.788  0.138  0.003  -0.308  0.005        
   
∆Deposit Rate  0.073  0.634  0.196  0.046     
-0.481  0.014  -0.168  0.315 
3  1996-2003  ∆Deposit Rate  -0.026  0.840  0.039  0.001  -0.330  0.002        
   
∆Deposit Rate  0.126  0.470  0.103  0.005     
-0.518  0.004  -0.142  0.420 
4  1997-2004  ∆Deposit Rate  0.005  0.967  0.035  0.009  -0.313  0.003        
   
∆Deposit Rate  0.212  0.241  0.115  0.007     
-0.551  0.002  -0.085  0.614 
5  1998-2005  ∆Deposit Rate  -0.004  0.976  0.093  0.051  -0.443  0.000        
   
∆Deposit Rate  0.030  0.871  0.103  0.002     
-0.477  0.008  -0.392  0.093 
6  1999-2006  ∆Deposit Rate  -0.036  0.771  0.053  0.008  -0.447  0.000        
   
∆Deposit Rate  -0.072  0.698  0.041  0.008     
-0.412  0.017  -0.493  0.018 
7  2000-2007  ∆Deposit Rate  -0.021  0.860  0.025  0.043  -0.428  0.000        
   
∆Deposit Rate  -0.071  0.690  0.007  0.038     
-0.378  0.024  -0.495  0.016 
 
1994-2007  ∆Deposit Rate  -0.015  0.872  0.459  0.000  -0.392  0.000        
   
∆Deposit Rate  0.220  0.060  0.455  0.000     
-0.726  0.000  -0.133  0.225 
1  1994-2001  ∆Lending Rate  0.024  0.679  0.154  0.006  -0.134  0.049        
   
∆Lending Rate  0.158  0.037  0.171  0.029     
-0.589  0.001  0.002  0.984 
7  2000-2007  ∆Lending Rate  -0.048  0.463  0.056  0.043  -0.043  0.623        
   
∆Lending Rate  -0.041  0.647  0.055  0.001     
-0.057  0.687  -0.028  0.853 
 
1994-2007  ∆Lending Rate  -0.002  0.986  0.707  0.000  -0.400  0.000        
   
∆Lending Rate  0.096  0.374  0.706  0.000     





Conc. Rank    Dep. Variable    Constant  Prob.    ∆BR    Prob.  ECt-1        Prob.     EC  t-1      Prob.     EC t-1       Prob. 
  ZAMBIA   
1  1994-2001  ∆Deposit Rate  0.006  0.919  0.782  0.000  -0.404  0.000        
   
∆Deposit Rate  -0.030  0.709  0.777  0.000     
-0.318  0.038  -0.529  0.012 
2  1995-2002  ∆Deposit Rate  -0.012  0.836  0.771  0.000  -0.403  0.000        
   
∆Deposit Rate  -0.054  0.485  0.768  0.000     
-0.316  0.037  -0.548  0.009 
3  1996-2003  ∆Deposit Rate  -0.040  0.495  0.759  0.000  -0.374  0.000        
   
∆Deposit Rate  -0.066  0.413  0.760  0.000     
-0.320  0.046  -0.459  0.030 
4  1997-2004  ∆Deposit Rate  -0.066  0.252  0.768  0.000  -0.396  0.000        
   
∆Deposit Rate  -0.096  0.212  0.769  0.000     
-0.328  0.041  -0.497  0.016 
5  1998-2005  ∆Deposit Rate  -0.023  0.493  0.636  0.000  -0.135  0.204        
   
∆Deposit Rate  0.006  0.912  0.623  0.000     
-0.292  0.207  -0.039  0.814 
6  1999-2006  ∆Deposit Rate  -0.052  0.374  0.779  0.000  -0.390  0.001        
   
∆Deposit Rate  -0.075  0.325  0.781  0.000     
-0.335  0.037  -0.472  0.022 
7  2000-2007  ∆Deposit Rate  0.022  0.431  0.567  0.004  0.320  0.000        
   
∆Deposit Rate  0.095  0.021  0.536  0.000     
-0.391  0.060  0.385  0.037 
 
1994-2007  ∆Deposit Rate  -0.006  0.860  0.766  0.000  -0.334  0.000        
   
∆Deposit Rate  -0.014  0.754  0.766  0.000     
-0.306  0.007  -0.369  0.009 
1  1994-2001  ∆Lending Rate  -0.035  0.458  0.749  0.000  -0.471  0.000        
   
∆Lending Rate  -0.187  0.001  0.696  0.000     
0.317  0.148  -0.951  0.000 
2  1995-2002  ∆Lending Rate  -0.013  0.775  0.776  0.000  -0.435  0.000        
   
∆Lending Rate  -0.181  0.003  0.732  0.000     
0.351  0.111  -0.928  0.000 
3  1996-2003  ∆Lending Rate  -0.037  0.417  0.813  0.000  -0.413  0.001        
   
∆Lending Rate  -0.201  0.001  0.759  0.000     
0.389  0.084  -0.891  0.000 
4  1997-2004  ∆Lending Rate  -0.054  0.220  0.799  0.000  -0.474  0.000        
   
∆Lending Rate  -0.218  0.000  0.733  0.000     
0.612  0.021  -0.920  0.000 
5  1998-2005  ∆Lending Rate  -0.046  0.286  0.797  0.000  -0.467  0.000        
   
∆Lending Rate  -0.225  0.000  0.728  0.000     
0.678  0.013  -0.932  0.000 
6  1999-2006  ∆Lending Rate  -0.024  0.273  0.881  0.000  -0.328  0.000        
   
∆Lending Rate  0.012  0.747  0.874  0.000     
-0.602  0.015  -0.204  0.131 
7  2000-2007  ∆Lending Rate  -0.025  0.470  0.485  0.000  -0.911  0.000        
   
∆Lending Rate  -0.067  0.120  0.464  0.000     
-0.724  0.000  -1.039  0.000 
 
1994-2007  ∆Lending Rate  -0.006  0.804  0.773  0.000  -0.462  0.000        
   
∆Lending Rate  -0.056  0.097  0.758  0.000     
-0.169  0.269  -0.663  0.340 
 
 
A4: MEAN ADJUSTMENT LAGS 
 
Italicised lags are not statistically significant given the probability values or the sign of their corresponding error correction term’s coefficient. 
Additionally, only where both EC+t-1  and  EC-t-1 lags are statistically significant do we apply the Wald test to determine if the resultant 
EC+t-1  and  EC-t-1 lags are statistically significant do we apply the Wald test to determine if the resultant mean adjustment lags are truly different. 
MAL: Symmetric Mean Adjustment Lag 
MAL+: Mean Adjustment Lag when the bank rate is above its equilibrium with the official rate and the impulse is for bank rates to fall 
















7  1994-2001  Deposit Rate  0.536  0.685  0.411  7.363  0 
6  1995-2002  Deposit Rate  0.485  0.509  0.45  8.61  0 
5  1996-2003  Deposit Rate  0.637  0.751  0.515  6.306  0.003 
4  1997-2004  Deposit Rate  0.583  0.705  0.464  6.898  0.002 
2  1998-2005  Deposit Rate  0.564  0.654  0.465  6.401  0.003 
1  1999-2006  Deposit Rate  3.425  1.523  2.494  N/A  N/A 
 
1994-2007  Deposit Rate  0.633  0.708  0.545  10.358  0 
7  1994-2001  Lending Rate  0.523  1.082  0.33  7.738  0.001 
6  1995-2002  Lending Rate  0.399  12.041  0.422  8.321  0 
5  1996-2003  Lending Rate  0.434  0.725  0.28  9.326  0.005 
4  1997-2004  Lending Rate  0.412  0.535  0.298  7.152  0.001 
2  1998-2005  Lending Rate  0.42  0.501  0.301  6.356  0.003 
1  1999-2006  Lending Rate  0.215  0.203  0.248  13.215  0 
 
1994-2007  Lending Rate  0.413  1.018  0.263  25.715  0 
26 








1  1994-2001  Deposit Rate  2.786  0.942  15.619  N/A  N/A 
2  1995-2002  Deposit Rate  2.647  0.785  13.506  N/A  N/A 
4  1997-2004  Deposit Rate  18.554  4.908  7.79  N/A  N/A 
5  1998-2005  Deposit Rate  24.042  6.458  13.544  N/A  N/A 
 
1994-2007  Deposit Rate  2.594  0.961  10.861  37.88  0 
1  1994-2001  Lending Rate  3.756  3.453  3.937  14.356  0 
2  1995-2002  Lending Rate  5.52  13.571  3.331  N/A  N/A 
3  1996-2003  Lending Rate  2.868  7.108  1.471  N/A  N/A 
4  1997-2004  Lending Rate  74.947  8.284  1.702  N/A  N/A 
5  1998-2005  Lending Rate  2.832  6.238  1.473  N/A  N/A 
6  1999-2006  Lending Rate  3.088  3.283  2.823  N/A  N/A 
7  2000-2007  Lending Rate  1.211  1.289  1.017  12.3654  0 
 
1994-2007  Lending Rate  1.665  2.175  1.428  11.48  0 
 








1  1994-2001  Deposit Rate  4.042  1.76  10.826  N/A  N/A 
2  1995-2002  Deposit Rate  2.8  1.674  4.784  N/A  N/A 
3  1996-2003  Deposit Rate  2.913  1.73  6.298  N/A  N/A 
4  1997-2004  Deposit Rate  3.081  1.607  10.357  N/A  N/A 
5  1998-2005  Deposit Rate  2.049  1.882  2.286  N/A  N/A 
6  1999-2006  Deposit Rate  2.119  2.33  1.945  9.372  0 
7  2000-2007  Deposit Rate  2.28  2.625  2.008  8.629  0 
  1994-2007  Deposit Rate  1.38  0.751  4.097  19.747  0 
1  1994-2001  Lending Rate  6.31  1.408  515.111  N/A  N/A 
7  2000-2007  Lending Rate  21.814  16.465  33.91  N/A  N/A 
  1994-2007  Lending Rate  0.732  0.548  1.168  15.784  0 
 








1  1994-2001  Deposit Rate  0.539  0.7  0.421  7.806  0.001 
2  1995-2002  Deposit Rate  0.567  0.734  0.423  7.935  0.001 
3  1996-2003  Deposit Rate  0.644  0.75  0.522  6.149  0.003 
4  1997-2004  Deposit Rate  0.587  0.705  0.465  6.763  0.002 
5  1998-2005  Deposit Rate  2.704  1.291  9.752  N/A  N/A 
6  1999-2006  Deposit Rate  0.566  0.653  0.464  8.256  0.003 
7  2000-2007  Deposit Rate  -13.369  1.185  1.204  N/A  N/A 
  1994-2007  Deposit Rate  0.7  0.765  0.635  10.107  0 
1  1994-2001  Lending Rate  0.533  0.959  0.319  N/A  N/A 
2  1995-2002  Lending Rate  0.515  0.763  0.288  N/A  N/A 
3  1996-2003  Lending Rate  0.452  0.619  0.27  N/A  N/A 
4  1997-2004  Lending Rate  0.425  0.435  0.29  6.326  0 
5  1998-2005  Lending Rate  0.435  0.4  0.291  8.256  0 
6  1999-2006  Lending Rate  0.363  0.208  0.615  9.365  0 
7  2000-2007  Lending Rate  0.565  0.74  0.516  7.325  0 
  1994-2007  Lending Rate  0.492  1.431  0.366  N/A  N/A 
 
 












































































Table E1    Explanatory Variables 




F-stat  Prob. 
7   1994-2001    Deposit Rate    0.006    0.929    0.782    0.000   -0.003    0.963    0.762  0.000  0.700    0.000 
6   1995-2002    Deposit Rate    -0.003    0.959    0.759    0.000   -0.011    0.878    0.742  0.000  0.692    0.000 
5   1996-2003    Deposit Rate    -0.019    0.757    0.759    0.000   -0.023    0.747    0.725  0.000  0.700    0.000 
4   1997-2004    Deposit Rate    -0.032    0.598    0.767    0.000   -0.046    0.504    0.771  0.000  0.682    0.000 
2   1998-2005    Deposit Rate    -0.013    0.828    0.779    0.000   -0.018    0.790    0.755  0.000  0.722    0.000 
1   1999-2006    Deposit Rate    -0.018    0.365    0.613    0.000   -0.050    0.568    0.748  0.000  0.739    0.000 
3   2000-2007    Deposit Rate    0.010    0.717    0.586    0.000    0.013    0.686    0.567  0.000  0.596    0.000 
1994-2007    Deposit Rate    0.005    0.904    0.720    0.000    0.005    0.906    0.719    0.000  0.722  0.000 
7   1994-2001    Lending Rate    -0.004    0.942    0.741    0.000   -0.002    0.969    0.757  0.000  0.768    0.000 
6   1995-2002    Lending Rate    0.004    0.000    0.768    0.000   0.002    0.979    0.786  0.000  0.786    0.000 
5   1996-2003    Lending Rate    -0.013    0.783    0.807    0.000   -0.008    0.883    0.806  0.000  0.834    0.000 
4   1997-2004    Lending Rate    -0.016    0.722    0.792    0.000   -0.008    0.885    0.786  0.000  0.837    0.000 
2   1998-2005    Lending Rate    -0.015    0.733    0.790    0.000   -0.008    0.878    0.786  0.000  0.831    0.000 
1   1999-2006    Lending Rate    -0.014    0.557    0.869    0.000   -0.040    0.124    1.037  0.000  0.759    0.000 
3   2000-2007    Lending Rate    -0.001    0.939    0.902    0.000    -0.017    0.251    1.012  0.000  0.837    0.000 
1994-2007    Lending Rate    0.987    0.000    0.826    0.000    0.006    0.849    0.806    0.000  0.852  0.000 
15.178  0.000 
28.995  0.000 
22.168  0.000 
14.457  0.000 
24.429  0.000 
41.870  0.000 
0.457  0.366 
52.203  0.000 
14.501  0.000 
65.178  0.000 
75.620  0.000 
59.572  0.000 
45.716  0.000 
8.427  0.000 
0.146  0.841 
123.735  0.000 
 
A5: SHORT RUN (SR) MAGNITUDE OF ADJUSTMENT 
 
SR (∆BR) is the short run symmetric change in the  official /policy rate 
SR (∆BR)+ is the short run asymmetric positive change  in the  official/policy rate 
























Table E2    Explanatory Variables 
Conc. Rank    Dep.Variable    Constant    prob.    SR (∆BR)    prob.    Constant  prob.  SR (∆BR)+    prob.    SR (∆BR)-    prob. 
 
SR 
BOTSWANA  F-stat  Prob. 
1   1994-2001    Deposit Rate    -0.037    0.586    -0.136    0.456    0.022   0.750    -0.519  0.053  0.425    0.114 
2   1995-2002    Deposit Rate    -0.016    0.779    0.070    0.775    9.578   0.000    -0.207  0.517  0.193    0.584 
3   1996-2003    Deposit Rate    -0.003    0.902    0.064    0.319    0.001    0.971    0.036  0.697  0.098    0.321 
4   1997-2004    Deposit Rate    0.003    0.823    0.064    0.385    0.007    0.773    0.029  0.782  0.104    0.350 
5   1998-2005    Deposit Rate    -0.006    0.792    0.063    0.422    -0.006    0.820    0.057  0.594  0.068    0.579 
6   1999-2006    Deposit Rate    0.001    0.979    0.052    0.484    -0.001    0.953    0.071  0.492  0.029    0.799 
7   2000-2007    Deposit Rate    -0.007    0.752    0.042    0.563    -0.008    0.727    0.055  0.602  0.029    0.788 
1994-2007    Deposit Rate    -0.015    0.676    0.100    0.373    0.010   0.781    -0.131    0.414  0.374  0.046 
1   1994-2001    Lending Rate    0.008    0.724    0.102    0.050    0.032   0.155    -0.016  0.852  0.376    0.000 
2   1995-2002    Lending Rate    0.008    0.761    0.159    0.003    0.034   0.163    -0.017  0.894  0.395    0.000 
3   1996-2003    Lending Rate    0.010    0.544    0.264    0.000    0.014   0.415    0.190  0.012  0.272    0.001 
4   1997-2004    Lending Rate    0.010    0.544    0.206    0.000    0.014   0.415    0.190  0.012  0.272    0.000 
5   1998-2005    Lending Rate    0.019    0.236    0.245    0.000    0.020   0.246    0.201  0.006  0.217    0.009 
6   1999-2006    Lending Rate    0.018    0.206    0.278    0.000    0.015   0.299    0.262  0.000  0.211    0.004 
7   2000-2007    Lending Rate    0.007    0.519    0.388    0.000    0.006   0.677    0.270  0.000  0.241    0.000 
1994-2007    Lending Rate    0.014    0.339    0.413    0.000   0.021    0.160    0.295    0.000  0.446  0.000 
7.082  0.000 
9.237  0.000 
3.654  0.652 
12.048  0.000 
15.715  0.000 
4.365  0.569 
5.365  0.126 
20.498  0.000 
15.499  0.000 
10.108  0.000 
6.592  0.000 
8.299  0.000 
9.413  0.000 
10.139  0.000 
10.612  0.000 




Table E3    Explanatory Variables 
Conc. Rank    Dep.Variable    Constant    prob.    SR (∆BR)    prob.    Constant  prob.  SR (∆BR)+    prob.    SR (∆BR)-    prob. 
 
SR 
NIGERIA  F-stat  Prob. 
1   1994-2001    Deposit Rate    -0.019    0.875    0.701    0.000    -0.004    0.968    0.780  0.004  0.833    0.000 
2   1995-2002    Deposit Rate    -0.014    0.789    0.739    0.000    -0.002    0.948    0.713  0.000  0.780    0.000 
3   1996-2003    Deposit Rate    -0.018    0.735    0.691    0.000    -0.007    0.929    0.714  0.000  0.656    0.000 
4   1997-2004    Deposit Rate    -0.031    0.579    0.678    0.000    -0.006    0.910    0.705  0.000  0.635    0.000 
5   1998-2005    Deposit Rate    -0.013    0.803    0.669    0.000    -0.037    0.891    0.680  0.000  0.657    0.000 
6   1999-2006    Deposit Rate    -0.025    0.456    0.683    0.000    -0.007    0.873    0.723  0.000  0.640    0.000 
7   2000-2007    Deposit Rate    0.019    0.463    0.693    0.000    0.365    0.855    0.708  0.000  0.677    0.000 
1994-2007    Deposit Rate    -0.008    0.938    0.482    0.000    0.034    0.720    0.429    0.007  0.700  0.000 
1   1994-2001    Lending Rate    -0.046    0.571    0.154  0.006  0.104   0.130    0.128  0.342  1.177    0.000 
2   1995-2002    Lending Rate    -0.042    0.527    0.110    0.344    0.110    0.776    0.196  0.213  -0.008    0.968 
3   1996-2003    Lending Rate    -0.039    0.486    0.128    0.272    0.092    0.917    0.181  0.196  -0.007    0.893 
4   1997-2004    Lending Rate    -0.036    0.448    0.118    0.251    0.078    0.085    0.167  0.181  -0.007    0.824 
5   1998-2005    Lending Rate    -0.033    0.414    0.109    0.231    0.070    0.366    0.154  0.167  -0.006    0.760 
6   1999-2006    Lending Rate    -0.031    0.382    0.101    0.214    0.062    0.237    0.142  0.154  -0.006    0.701 
7   2000-2007    Lending Rate    -0.047    0.470    0.056  0.043  -0.073    0.293    0.204  0.253  -0.023    0.829 
1994-2007    Lending Rate    0.008    0.000    0.707  0.000  0.147   0.099    -0.069    0.643  0.989  0.000 
19.374  0.000 
12.635  0.000 
8.240  0.000 
10.374  0.000 
11.766  0.000 
12.673  0.009 
13.265  0.001 
13.651  0.000 
7.365  0.000 
4.256  0.356 
3.257  0.257 
4.366  0.660 
4.365  0.366 
4.365  0.146 
16.582  0.008 




Table E5    Explanatory Variables 




F-stat  Prob. 
7   1994-2001    Deposit Rate    -1.412    0.002    0.983    0.000    0.007  1.222  0.935    0.931 
6   1995-2002    Deposit Rate    -1.462    0.001    0.984    0.000    0.037  0.583  0.953    0.970 
5   1996-2003    Deposit Rate    -1.401    0.000    0.973    0.000    0.004  0.831  1.013    1.009 
4   1997-2004    Deposit Rate    -0.909    0.001    0.931    0.000    0.052  0.597  1.104    1.085 
2   1998-2005    Deposit Rate    -0.435    0.041    0.887    0.000    0.014  0.774  1.114    1.082 
1   1999-2006    Deposit Rate    -0.428    0.000    0.864    0.000    0.046  0.727  1.171    1.096 
3   2000-2007    Deposit Rate    0.217    0.563    0.908    -    0.083  0.531  1.005    1.047 
1994-2007    Deposit Rate    -0.389    0.046    0.916    0.000    0.021    0.590  0.925  0.850 
7   1994-2001    Lending Rate    2.718    0.000    1.033    0.000    0.028  0.418  1.295    1.157 
6   1995-2002    Lending Rate    2.881    0.000    1.024    0.000    -0.028  1.540  1.333    1.127 
5   1996-2003    Lending Rate    3.097    0.000    1.010    0.000    0.042  0.431  1.252    1.115 
4   1997-2004    Lending Rate    3.430    0.000    0.984    0.000    -0.072  1.125  1.240    1.147 
2   1998-2005    Lending Rate    3.575    0.000    0.973    0.000    0.034  0.522  1.371    1.113 
1   1999-2006    Lending Rate    3.690    0.000    0.964    0.000    -0.081  0.918  1.247    1.179 
3   2000-2007    Lending Rate    0.004    0.842    1.018    -    -0.071  0.584  1.337    1.094 
1994-2007    Lending Rate    3.544    0.000    0.982    0.000    -0.033    0.245  1.101  0.949 
1.237  0.112 
3.266  0.365 
3.657  0.127 
2.169  0.958 
9.327  0.070 
4.366  0.668 
0.316  0.370 
9.264  0.095 
15.366  0.040 
4.366  0.090 
8.366  0.457 
5.368  0.126 
7.366  0.357 
9.366  0.057 
0.569  0.889 





Table E4    Explanatory Variables 
Conc. Rank    Dep.Variable    Constant    prob.    SR (∆BR)    prob.    Constant  prob.  SR (∆BR)+    prob.    SR (∆BR)-    prob. 
 
SR 
ZAMBIA  F-stat  Prob. 
1   1994-2001    Deposit Rate    0.006    0.929    0.782    0.000    -0.003    0.963    0.762  0.000  0.700    0.000 
2   1995-2002    Deposit Rate    -0.015    0.814    0.771    0.000    -0.026    0.716    0.752  0.000  0.677    0.000 
3   1996-2003    Deposit Rate    -0.019    0.757    0.759    0.000    -0.023    0.747    0.725  0.000  0.700    0.000 
4   1997-2004    Deposit Rate    -0.032    0.598    0.768    0.000    -0.046    0.504    0.771  0.000  0.682    0.000 
5   1998-2005    Deposit Rate    -0.013    0.828    0.636    0.000    -0.018    0.790    0.755  0.000  0.722    0.000 
6   1999-2006    Deposit Rate    -0.025    0.470    0.779    0.000    -0.021    0.591    0.589  0.000  0.633    0.000 
7   2000-2007    Deposit Rate    0.019    0.477    0.567    0.004    0.022   0.474    0.555  0.000  0.583    0.000 
1994-2007    Deposit Rate    -0.010    0.780    0.766    0.000    -0.014    0.724    0.733    0.000  0.699  0.000 
1   1994-2001    Lending Rate    -0.004    0.942    0.749    0.000    -0.002    0.969    0.757  0.000  0.768    0.000 
2   1995-2002    Lending Rate    0.004    0.939    0.776    0.000    0.001   0.979    0.786  0.000  0.771    0.000 
3   1996-2003    Lending Rate    -0.013    0.783    0.813    0.000    -0.008    0.883    0.806  0.000  0.834    0.000 
4   1997-2004    Lending Rate    -0.016    0.722    0.799    0.000    -0.008    0.885    0.786  0.000  0.837    0.000 
5   1998-2005    Lending Rate    -0.015    0.733    0.797    0.000    -0.008    0.878    0.786  0.000  0.831    0.000 
6   1999-2006    Lending Rate    -0.019    0.437    0.881    0.000    -0.044    0.098    1.042  0.000  0.771    0.000 
7   2000-2007    Lending Rate    0.007    0.000    0.485    0.000    -0.009    0.440    1.002  0.000  0.826    0.000 
1994-2007    Lending Rate    -0.006    0.832    0.773    0.000    -0.019    0.534    0.825    0.000  0.714  0.000 
16.878  0.000 
22.015  0.000 
14.358  0.000 
9.364  0.000 
11.788  0.000 
13.370  0.006 
14.401  0.000 
15.074  0.000 
10.642  0.045 
8.369  0.000 
18.842  0.000 
21.098  0.000 
15.368  0.000 
9.365  0.000 
7.365  0.000 
18.596  0.041 
 
A5 continued...: LONG RUN (LR) MAGNITUDE OF ADJUSTMENT 
 
LR (BR) is the short run symmetric positive change  in the  official/policy rate 
LR (∆BR+) is the short run asymmetric positive change  in the  official/policy rate 























Table E6    Explanatory Variables 




F-stat  Prob. 
1   1994-2001    Deposit Rate    4.038    0.003    0.417    0.000    0.019  0.595  0.703    0.699 
2   1995-2002    Deposit Rate    2.621    0.002    0.516    0.000    -0.026  0.583  0.723    0.742 
3   1996-2003    Deposit Rate    0.209    0.542    0.805    -    -0.014  0.335  0.789    0.785 
4   1997-2004    Deposit Rate    -0.375    0.044    0.884    -    0.084  0.086  0.884    0.845 
5   1998-2005    Deposit Rate    1.108    0.100    0.606    0.000    0.030  0.531  0.808    0.830 
6   1999-2006    Deposit Rate    2.775    0.000    0.905    -    -0.033  0.727  0.913    0.857 
7   2000-2007    Deposit Rate    2.983    0.000    0.681    -    0.062  0.063  0.546    0.786 
1994-2007    Deposit Rate    5.884    0.001    0.295    0.007    0.009    0.815  0.271  0.923 
1   1994-2001    Lending Rate    4.099    0.000    0.788    0.000    0.078  0.079  1.008    0.820 
2   1995-2002    Lending Rate    4.304    0.000    0.828    0.000    -0.040  0.351  0.987    0.845 
3   1996-2003    Lending Rate    1.872    0.000    0.973    0.000    -0.039  0.504  0.917    0.818 
4   1997-2004    Lending Rate    1.893    0.000    0.972    0.000    -0.051  0.675  0.912    0.856 
5   1998-2005    Lending Rate    1.907    0.000    0.971    0.000    -0.041  0.149  1.196    0.816 
6   1999-2006    Lending Rate    3.097    0.000    0.889    0.000    -0.050  0.439  0.981    0.903 
7   2000-2007    Lending Rate    4.253    0.000    0.811    0.000    -0.005  0.660  0.625    0.586 
1994-2007    Lending Rate    1.591    0.005    0.976    0.000    0.015    0.291  0.773  0.797 
2.895  0.216 
8.031  0.012 
0.376  0.950 
0.981  0.887 
2.193  0.654 
0.612  0.889 
0.419  0.887 
1.092  0.625 
2.259  0.354 
0.013  0.890 
4.859  0.120 
7.114  0.045 
1.386  0.892 
0.982  0.945 
0.013  0.954 








Table E7    Explanatory Variables 




F-stat  Prob. 
1   1994-2001    Deposit Rate    3.519    0.030    0.567    0.000    0.017  0.531  0.628    0.624 
2   1995-2002    Deposit Rate    5.666    0.001    0.669    -    0.074  0.520  0.645    0.663 
3   1996-2003    Deposit Rate    7.506    0.000    0.719    -    0.021  0.299  0.705    0.701 
4   1997-2004    Deposit Rate    6.795    0.000    0.817    -    0.026  0.814  0.801    0.796 
5   1998-2005    Deposit Rate    3.947    0.000    0.860    -    -0.036  0.798  0.880    0.802 
6   1999-2006    Deposit Rate    4.145    0.652    0.874    -    -0.020  0.459  0.902    0.807 
7   2000-2007    Deposit Rate    1.803    0.257    0.849    -    0.115  0.117  0.887    0.772 
1994-2007    Deposit Rate    -0.016    0.983    0.856    0.000    -0.037    0.732  0.726  0.612 
1   1994-2001    Lending Rate    12.874   0.000    0.484    0.000    -0.041  0.538  0.978    0.873 
2   1995-2002    Lending Rate    1.532    0.004    0.965    -    -0.054  0.720  0.973    0.913 
3   1996-2003    Lending Rate    -2.356    0.562    1.098    -    -0.043  0.159  1.276    0.871 
4   1997-2004    Lending Rate    -4.236    0.356    1.028    -    -0.053  0.468  1.046    0.964 
5   1998-2005    Lending Rate    -3.365    0.432    0.932    -    -0.005  0.704  0.987    0.835 
6   1999-2006    Lending Rate    -3.890    0.000    1.025    -    -0.035  0.168  1.074    0.931 
7   2000-2007    Lending Rate    8.166    0.000    0.796    0.000    -0.089  0.457  0.687    0.997 
1994-2007    Lending Rate    6.612    0.000    0.917    0.000    0.135    0.139  0.465  1.088 
5.696  0.112 
10.833  0.000 
3.176  0.124 
1.818  0.123 
0.606  0.137 
2.188  0.167 
3.219  0.366 
3.892  0.357 
0.540  0.156 
2.813  0.366 
7.660  0.046 
9.916  0.037 
4.186  0.669 
1.817  0.369 
2.813  0.156 
7.660  0.000 
 
WALD TEST 
Table E8    Explanatory Variables 




F-stat  Prob. 
1   1994-2001    Deposit Rate    -1.412    0.002    0.983    0.000    0.021  0.650  0.984    0.956 
2   1995-2002    Deposit Rate    -1.462    0.000    0.984    0.000    -0.028  0.637  0.790    0.811 
3   1996-2003    Deposit Rate    -1.401    0.001    0.973    0.000    -0.016  0.366  0.974    0.897 
4   1997-2004    Deposit Rate    -0.909    0.001    0.931    0.000    0.092  0.094  0.966    0.924 
5   1998-2005    Deposit Rate    -0.435    0.041    0.887    0.000    0.033  0.581  0.883    0.907 
6   1999-2006    Deposit Rate    0.568    0.005    0.796    0.000    -0.036  0.795  0.998    0.937 
7   2000-2007    Deposit Rate    0.865    0.017    0.776    0.000    0.068  0.069  0.597    0.859 
1994-2007    Deposit Rate    -0.431    0.024    0.921    0.000    0.019    0.598  0.837  0.923 
1   1994-2001    Lending Rate    2.718    0.000    1.033    0.000    0.085  0.086  1.102    0.897 
2   1995-2002    Lending Rate    2.881    0.000    1.024    0.000    -0.043  0.384  1.079    0.923 
3   1996-2003    Lending Rate    3.097    0.000    1.010    0.000    -0.043  0.551  1.002    0.894 
4   1997-2004    Lending Rate    3.430    0.000    0.984    0.000    -0.055  0.738  0.997    0.936 
5   1998-2005    Lending Rate    3.575    0.000    0.973    0.000    -0.044  0.163  1.307    0.892 
6   1999-2006    Lending Rate    3.690    0.000    0.964    0.000    -0.054  0.480  1.072    0.988 
7   2000-2007    Lending Rate    4.046    0.507    0.926    0.000    -0.006  0.721  1.012    0.856 
1992-2007    Lending Rate    3.525    0.000    0.985    0.000    -0.036    0.172  1.100  0.954 
1.475  0.924 
1.737  0.845 
4.548  0.365 
8.215  0.065 
12.998  0.036 
6.165  0.089 
4.383  0.126 
7.999  0.047 
0.799  0.924 
1.913  0.854 
2.639  0.755 
3.112  0.652 
3.421  0.685 
7.500  0.027 
11.250  0.012 
8.365  0.024 
30